Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Angola 1884-1915. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Angola 1884-1915. Mostrar todas as mensagens
quinta-feira, 14 de junho de 2007
Notas biográficas como oficial de António Ribeiro Monteiro
Agradecimentos: Arquivo Histórico Militar
terça-feira, 12 de junho de 2007
domingo, 10 de junho de 2007
João Sarmento Pimentel, Memórias do Capitão. Editorial Inova, Porto, 1974
Este livro tem dois capítulos dedicados à guerra no sul de Angola: "O «Cabo Verde»" e "A ferro e fogo". Ambos se passam em 1915, o ano da morte do tenente Monteiro. [A propósito de Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro].Ver:
sexta-feira, 8 de junho de 2007
A construção do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes
Reprodução por meios fotográficos de Elza Amaral© Família de António Aniceto Monteiro
Estas fotografias dizem respeito à construção do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes (depois Moçâmedes e, actualmente, Namibe) durante a primeira estadia (antes de 27 de Dezembro de 1909) do alferes Monteiro em Angola. Ver: Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro. Ver ainda: CAMINHO-DE-FERRO DE MOÇÂMEDES 1909/1910.
quinta-feira, 7 de junho de 2007
António Aniceto Monteiro, a irmã e o pai em Angola
Reprodução por meios fotográficos de Elza Amaral© Família de António Aniceto Monteiro
Estas fotografias dizem respeito à segunda estadia (depois de 16 de Dezembro de 1910) do tenente Monteiro em Angola. Devem ser datadas já de 1911 a 1915. Ver: Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro.
quarta-feira, 6 de junho de 2007
O tenente António Ribeiro Monteiro em Angola
Reprodução por meios fotográficos de Elza Amaral© Família de António Aniceto Monteiro
Esta fotografia diz respeito à segunda estadia (depois de 16 de Dezembro de 1910) do tenente Monteiro em Angola. Deve ser datada já de 1914 ou 1915. Ver: Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro.
terça-feira, 5 de junho de 2007
O alferes António Ribeiro Monteiro em Angola
Reprodução por meios fotográficos de Elza Amaral© Família de António Aniceto Monteiro
Esta fotografia diz respeito à construção do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes (depois Moçâmedes e, actualmente, Namibe) durante a primeira estadia (antes de 27 de Dezembro de 1909) do alferes Monteiro em Angola. Deve ser do início da estadia (à volta de 1906). Ver: Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro.
segunda-feira, 4 de junho de 2007
Intervenção no "Colloquium António Aniceto Monteiro", 4 de Junho de 2007
Angola e António Aniceto Monteiro
Jorge Rezende (*)
Jorge Rezende (*)
O pai de António Aniceto Monteiro chamava-se António Ribeiro Monteiro e era alferes de infantaria quando, em 4 de Julho de 1905, foi requisitado para desempenhar uma comisão de serviço dependente do Ministério da Marinha e Ultramar na construção do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes. Dois dias depois, na Paróquia dos Anjos, casou com Maria Joana Lino Figueiredo da Silva, “tendo sido dispensados dos proclamas por provisão de Exmo. Prelado” [AAM-CM] datada da véspera. No dia seguinte ao casamento, António Ribeiro Monteiro embarcou para Angola. Dez anos depois, dia por dia, a 7 de Julho de 1915, na sua casa de Mossâmedes, na rua dos Pescadores, morreu de doença, contraída durante operações militares resultantes da guerra no sul de Angola. Era então tenente de infantaria e deixou Maria Joana viúva e órfãos os dois filhos, Maria Petronila e António Aniceto, de nove e oito anos, respectivamente.
Para compreendermos as circunstâncias históricas que determinaram este início dramático da vida e do percurso angolano de António Aniceto Monteiro, temos que recuar até 1884.
Em 15 de Novembro de 1884, iniciou-se a Conferência de Berlim que se prolongaria até 26 de Fevereiro de 1885, em que participaram vários países europeus, incluindo o Império Otomano e ainda os Estados Unidos da América, tendo em vista a definição das regras para a partilha de África. Este continente tinha um solo e, sobretudo, um subsolo riquíssimos, que despertavam a cobiça das grandes potências de então. A grande burguesia industrial e financeira precisava dos recursos naturais africanos, nem que fosse em detrimento das populações de origem europeia que já estavam instaladas no litoral e, acima de tudo, das populações indígenas que, ao longo de gerações e gerações, ali sempre tinham vivido.
Claro que já havia conflitos em África resultantes das pretensões das potências europeias e, justamente, a Conferência de Berlim visava definir as regras daquilo que veio a chamar-se o “scramble for Africa”, a corrida desenfreada para a ocupação de África. Isso implicou o envio maciço de tropas e a consequente escalada dos conflitos principalmente com as tribos africanas. Aquele inverno de Berlim acabou por atear fogo a todo o continente.
Interessa especialmente o que se passou então na região de Mossâmedes, actualmente chamada Namibe. A província de Namibe fica no extremo sul e litoral de Angola e, vendo o mapa no sentido dos ponteiros do relógio, é banhada a oeste pelo Atlântico e faz fronteira, a norte, com Benguela, a leste, com Huíla (cuja capital é Lubango, antiga Sá da Bandeira) e Cunene (cuja capital é Ondjiva, antiga Pereira de Eça) e, a sul, com a Namíbia.
Ao longo de 1900 km, paralelamente à linha costeira, a província de Namibe e a Namíbia são atravessadas por um deserto que se estende para o interior cerca de 80 a 150 km. É considerado o mais antigo deserto do mundo, com mais de 80 milhões de anos, e a sua aridez é causada pelo ar frio e seco provocado pelas águas geladas da corrente de Benguela que corre de sul para nor-noroeste e das profundezas do oceano para a superfície, sobretudo devido à rotação da Terra.
Portugal enviou tropas para todas as regiões de África que reivindicava na altura. Em toda a parte havia conflitos, nomeadamente em Angola e Moçambique, mas a situação era particularmente grave no sul de Angola. Segundo René Pélissier “de 1885 a 1915, o sul de Angola foi a guerra”(1).
As populações do sul de Angola eram um mosaico de pequenos núcleos de origem europeia, que coexistiam com a esmagadora maioria de populações negras de diferentes etnias. Entre os primeiros, estavam os boers, instalados durante um período de tempo num território próprio na Huíla(2) e havia, ainda, colonos idos da ilha da Madeira, do Brasil, etc(3). As mais diversas correntes religiosas procuravam exercer a sua influência: católicos, protestantes, espiritanos franceses, luteranos, e outras(4).
Havia o tráfico de armas, como as Martini-Henry e as Westley Richards(5), algumas provindas da guerra civil americana, outras da África do Sul. As tribos africanas não só estavam organizadas – possuindo meios rudimentares de comunicação militar, por exemplo – como estavam armadas com armas de fogo das mais diversas origens(6).
A vida dos soldados portugueses não era, portanto, nada fácil. Além das dificuldades do terreno desértico ou semi-desértico, tinham que contar com uma resistência armada forte e quando, a partir de Outubro de 1914(7), tiveram que combater os alemães, por estes terem invadido o sul de Angola, continuavam a ser os negros os piores adversários. Os soldados que morriam, quando não morriam nos combates, morriam de sede e de doenças provenientes, muitas vezes, de beberem água inquinada. As marchas eram forçadas e os itinerários eram escolhidos de acordo com a necessidade de serem mais velozes do que a transmissão das mensagens através dos tantãs africanos. Os animais eram muito utilizados e, para o transporte de militares, os cavalos eram o meio preferido e, até, imprescindível.
Dos momentos mais altos da guerra, antes da chegada do alferes Monteiro, destacam-se as revoltas do Humbe: a primeira, de 1885-1886, a segunda, de 1891, e a terceira de 1897-1898(8). Um momento de viragem registou-se em 25 de Setembro de 1904(9), com a vitória dos Cuamatos (uma tribo Ovambo), sobre os portugueses, na batalha do Vau de Pembe. As baixas portuguesas foram centenas, entre mortos e desaparecidos. Diz René Pélissier: “É preciso que se meça bem a amplidão desta derrota, que equivalia a eliminar num único dia perto de um décimo das forças totais existentes em Angola”(10). Em Lisboa soou o alarme e fizeram-se planos pormenorizados de envio de homens e material para uma campanha de seis meses cuja despesa prevista era de 1 884 contos, “isto é, aproximadamente o mesmo que em 1892 tinha custado à França a conquista do Daomé”(11). Para dirigir todas as operações, foi chamado o capitão do Estado-Maior Alves Roçadas(12) que, segundo René Pélissier, “estava longe de ser um génio como se provaria com os acontecimentos de 1914”(13). Foi, provavelmente, dentro deste plano geral de ofensiva no sul de Angola que o alferes Monteiro foi requisitado para partir para África num tão curto espaço de tempo.
O alferes Monteiro, pai de António Aniceto Monteiro, tinha nascido em 1880 e assentado praça como voluntário em 1898, com dezoito anos incompletos. Finalizou o curso de infantaria da Escola do Exército em 1902 e foi promovido a alferes em 15 de Novembro de 1903.
Mal chegou a Luanda, em 1905, já casado com Maria Joana, foi enviado para o sul para participar na construção do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes, que foi iniciada nesse ano, embora a autorização do Governo remontasse a carta de lei de 1890. Em 1907, estavam prontos os primeiros 67 quilómetros. O engenheiro encarregado das obras era Artur Torres, futuro sogro de António Aniceto Monteiro. O projecto previa que a linha fosse até Lubango, antiga Sá da Bandeira, mas as obras pararam em 1910, provavelmente devido à guerra, quando estavam prontos 186 quilómetros. As obras só retomariam em 1917 e ficaram concluídas em 1923.
O casal António e Maria Joana teve dois filhos: Maria Petronila, que nasceu em 5 de Abril de 1906, e António Aniceto, que nasceu em 31 de Maio de 1907, ambos na freguesia de Santo Adrião de Mossâmedes.
Em 8 de Fevereiro de 1908, António Ribeiro Monteiro foi nomeado para provisoriamente exercer o cargo de chefe de dia e obras do caminho de ferro de Mossâmedes e, em 9 de Julho de 1909, foi nomeado condutor de 1ª classe.
No fim desse ano, dá-se uma viragem na vida de António Ribeiro Monteiro e nunca mais regressou à construção dos caminhos de ferro. Em 27 de Dezembro de 1909, por opinião da junta de saúde, veio para Portugal. Desconheço se a família o acompanhou.
Em 5 de Outubro de 1909, chegou ainda a ser nomeado para condutor de 1ª classe do caminho de ferro de Luanda, lugar que nunca ocupou. Em 17 de Abril de 1911 foi colocado na direcção fiscal do caminho de ferro de Benguela mas, não é certo que aí tivesse efectivamente trabalhado.
Nos três primeiros meses de 1910 António Ribeiro Monteiro esteve doente em Lisboa.
No dia 1 de Abril de 1910, foi colocado no Regimento de Infantaria nº 11, em Setúbal e, no dia 1 de Dezembro desse ano, é promovido a tenente. É através de um relatório manuscrito [ARM1], datado de 5 de Novembro, extremamente elogioso, acerca dos serviços prestados por António Ribeiro Monteiro nesse regimento (e que pode ter servido para a sua promoção), que ficamos a conhecer um pouco da sua personalidade singular.
Esse relatório, assinado por José Narciso d’Andrade(14), Coronel Comandante do D.R.R. 5, ao referir-se ao alferes Monteiro, diz “não ser fácil encarecer à altura do seu valor as qualidades de tão illustrado oficial, honestíssimo caracter e homem de sciencia”. Fala ainda nas suas qualidades como “constructor e engenheiro”, nos seus “conhecimentos especiaes ou scientificos”, na sua capacidade de ministrar a instrução aos soldados “subordinado a um plano pratico e compreensivel” e nas “referencias altamente elogiosas” que lhe foram feitas pelo comandante da brigada “motivadas pela execução rapida, perfeito acabamento e rigorosa disciplina em todos os trabalhos feitos”.
Mais adiante o relatório acrescenta:
“Querendo tornar extensivos aos officiaes do meu regimento a pratica dos levantamentos topographicos à vista, convidei o Snr. Alferes Monteiro a expor à corporação o que de mais util houvesse sobre esta especie de trabalhos.
Com tal profundeza de conhecimentos, clareza e feição desenvolveu o thema escolhido que não pude furtar-me a intimá-lo a apresentar por escripto a conferencia oral desenvolvida, com o fim de ser remettida para o Ministério da Guerra e ser devidamente apreciada”.
Entretanto, tinha ocorrido a revolução republicana de 5 de Outubro e, a esse propósito, o relatório do coronel Narciso d’Andrade refere:
“Por ocasião da Revolução que proclamou a Republica em Portugal, Setúbal foi, como se sabe, theatro de desorientação popular que se traduziu por incendios a repartições publicas, egrejas, etc.
Necessario se tornava mandar para a rua a força publica com o fim de evitar, sendo possivel a continuação de similhantes desvairamentos. Um capitão e um subalterno, levando sob o seu comando as praças disponiveis, saíram a coadjuvar a autoridade. Porem a população desrespeitou a força e feriu gravemente o seu comandante, bastante conhecido pelas suas ideias liberaes. Teve a força de retirar, à vista de similhante attitude.
Foi então que chamei o Alferes Monteiro e com uma diminuta força o encarreguei de se dirigir ao povo e obstar à continuação dos vandalismos até então praticados e em ameaça de continuarem.
De tal forma se houve e tal diplomacia desenvolveu que toda a gente acolheu com palmas as palavras do Alferes Monteiro e debandou sem que houvesse a mais leve resistencia ou continuassem na pratica dos actos pelos mesmos praticados. Attenta a attitude do povo, expôs-se n’esta difficil missão, aquelle illustre official, não só a ser desrespeitado como a ser esmagado pelo povo.
A pacificação e tranquillidade dos animos foi obtida pelo habil official da seguinte forma: Mandou fazer alto à sua força a uma distancia consideravel dos ajuntamentos, mas de forma que por todos fosse presenciado. Embainha depois a sua espada e dirigindo-se ao povo, falla-lhe tão patrioticamente que começando a ser ouvido com apupos terminou por ser obedecido com vivas e palmas.
Dias depois a população de Setubal, reconhecedora, combinava-se para lhe preparar uma manifestação de simphatia. Ignoro se se chegou a realizar; mas realizasse ou não, certo é que o Senhor Alferes Monteiro, é hoje, em Setubal, a pessoa de mais consideração que a sua cidade encerra”.
Mais adiante o relatório conta que tendo ele sido nomeado “defensor officioso” de um desertor, foi “por todos considerado um orador eximio, mais parecendo um distincto profissional na advocacia do que um homem que fez a sua estreia como amador”.
O relatório diz ainda que “como chefe de família e caracter está superior a todo o elogio”, o que parece significar que, nesse ano, a família vivia com ele em Setúbal.
É de assinalar que esta estadia do alferes Monteiro em 1910 em Setúbal explica a razão pela qual António Aniceto está registado no “livro de registos de nascimento da Administração deste concelho do ano de – 1910-1911”.
O relatório finaliza com o parágrafo seguinte:
“Tamanha é a gratidão dos habitantes de Mossamedes e tão profundas simpathias alli deixou que a pedido d’aquella cidade vae o alferes Monteiro, muito brevemente, desempenhar alli uma nova comissão de serviço publico”.
Ao ler estas quatro páginas manuscritas que elogiam o alferes Monteiro, é difícil não ver nos traços de carácter descritos, aqueles que viriam a ser os do seu filho, António Aniceto: a grande inteligência, a versatilidade e a amplidão das suas aptidões intelectuais, o sentido prático aliado à competência teórica, a capacidade de comunicação e transmissão dos seus conhecimentos, a simpatia e a coragem.
Em Dezembro de 1910, o recém promovido tenente Monteiro regressou a Angola, tendo embarcado no dia 2 e chegado a Luanda no dia 16.
Não se percebe muito bem onde esteve e o que fez, exactamente, o tenente Monteiro, em 1911. Até ao fim da vida viveu sempre, muito provavelmente, em Mossâmedes e, em 1911, pode ter estado parcialmente ao serviço do caminho de ferro, embora não na sua construção, que estava parada(15).
Entretanto, no ano de 1912, deu-se outro momento de viragem na vida do tenente Monteiro. Em Mossâmedes, no dia 9 de Abril, dirige o seguinte requerimento ao Presidente da República:
“António Ribeiro Monteiro, tenente de infantaria do exército da Metrópole, nomeado em Novembro de 1910, em comissão extraordinária, condutor de 1ª classe do Caminho de Ferro de Mossâmedes – onde já serviu desde Agosto de 1905 até Dezembro de 1909 – encontrando-se actualmente, por exoneração daquele cargo, apresentado na Secretaria Militar do Governo deste Distrito, necessita por motivos de força maior e para tratar de assuntos imperiosos de carácter particular, passar à situação de licença ilimitada; e assim, na sujeição de todas as disposições legais que lhe possam ser aplicáveis,
Pede a V. Ex.ª haja por bem conceder-lhe a referida licença”. [ARM1]
O que este documento significa exactamente, não sei. Apenas podemos imaginar o que sentiria um militar com família, que incluia dois filhos menores, em idade escolar, numa zona de guerra intensa que só tinha tendência a agravar-se. A licença foi concedida, a partir de 1 de Agosto, e o que ele fez depois, com essa licença, ignoro(16).
Sabe-se que, desde 1 de Setembro de 1913, “continuou na situação de adido mas em comissão extraordinária de serviço no Ministério das Colónias” [ARM1], e que foi colocado na “Secretaria Militar de Mossâmedes, por haver desistido da Licença ilimitada, no referido dia 1 de Setembro” [ARM1], tendo sido “nomeado chefe da Secção Militar da Fazenda de Mossâmedes na mesma data” [ARM1]. Foi exonerado deste cargo em 30 de Novembro de 1914.
Sabe-se, também, que até ao fim de 1913 não teve nenhum posto de comando, isto é, nunca participou, directamente, na guerra. A partir do início de 1913, o tempo de serviço em Angola deixou de ser acrescido de 50%, como até aí. Em 20 de Abril desse ano, um documento, assinado pelo tenente Monteiro em Mossâmedes, confirma que a situação tinha mudado radicalmente. Trata-se de um compromisso formal, obrigatório(17), que contém o seguinte texto premonitório:
“Eu, António Ribeiro Monteiro, tenente d’infantaria, juro pela minha honra, como cidadão, como oficial, que, enquanto pertencer à oficialidade do exército portuguez, defenderei a Patria e as leis da Republica, e servirei com zêlo e valor, cumprindo as ordens legais dos meus superiores, fazendo-me obedecer e respeitar dos meus subordinados, segundo a mais severa disciplina, observando e fazendo observar os direitos e deveres de cada um, e procurando por todos os meios ao meu alcance acrescentar a glória da Pátria e do exercito portuguez, para o que, se tanto fôr necessario, sacrificarei a propria vida. E, para firmeza de tudo, assim o declaro”. [ARM1]
Desde o desastre de Vau de Pembe, de 1904, que a guerra não teve um momento de pausa, mas seria despropositado contar aqui tudo o que sucedeu. Seriam necessárias muitas dezenas de páginas. Como já se disse, no final de 1914, os alemães invadiram o sul de Angola. A 18 de Dezembro de 1914, em virtude de opções tácticas erradas, Alves Roçadas é derrotado em Naulila pelas tropas alemãs(18). Mais uma vez, o número de baixas portuguesas é impressionante. No seguimento, Alves Roçadas acaba por vir embora de Angola, sem honra nem glória, embarcando no início de Maio de 1915 [ARM3].
Porém, não partiu para Lisboa sem antes ter colocado o tenente Monteiro na 27ª Companhia Indígena de Infantaria, em 6 de Março de 1915, não se sabendo se este, que tinha mais um perfil de intelectual e nunca tinha ocupado um posto dessa natureza, chegou a combater.
Entretanto, em 21 de Março o general Pereira de Eça(19,20) é nomeado comandante em chefe das tropas e governador geral de Angola. O seu principal objectivo era resolver o problema do sul, e para aí se dirigiu imediatamente para, pessoalmente, dirigir as operações contra os alemães e, sobretudo, contra a população negra.
Mostrando ser mais inteligente que Roçadas, Pereira de Eça nomeou o tenente Monteiro chefe da Secretaria Militar do Distrito de Mossâmedes, no dia 24 de Maio.
O principal documento que relata os últimos dias de vida do tenente Monteiro é de um tenente coronel de infantaria, João Ortigão Peres(21), ex-chefe do estado maior do corpo expedicionário no sul de Angola, e diz o seguinte:
(...)“o tenente de infantaria António Ribeiro Monteiro, encontrando-se em comissão extraordinária no sul de Angola (...). (...) havendo necessidade de proceder a um reconhecimento na região dos Cubáes (serra da Chella) este oficial, apezar de estar ainda bastante atacado pelas febres, pediu insistentemente que lhe fosse confiado esse serviço, que conseguiu levar a bom termo, regressando porem a Mossâmedes num tal estado que faleceu dias depois da sua chegada”.(...) [AAM-CM, AAM-RUL]
A ser verdade que, quando partiu, o tenente Monteiro já se encontrava doente e sendo conhecidas as dificuldades que uma tal missão, de vários dias, comportava, só é de admirar que ainda tivesse regressado com vida.
Anos mais tarde, António Aniceto Monteiro contava, assim, este episódio, provavelmente por lhe ter sido relatado pela mãe: “Tratava-se de averiguar se os alemães tinham invadido o sul de Angola. O meu pai voltou com uma perniciosa. Ao chegar a Mossâmedes, foi saudar a minha mãe e ao sair para o Estado Maior para informar do resultado da expedição caíu desmaiado mas mesmo assim foi ao Estado Maior. Nessa noite jantou em casa o General Roçadas. Meu pai teve que assistir ao jantar deitado numa cadeira de viagem. Faleceu nessa mesma noite”.
Apesar de algumas imprecisões devidas ao esfumar da memória que a passagem do tempo induz, como a referência a Alves Roçadas que, como sabemos, nessa altura, já não estava em Angola, este relato tem o mérito de informar que, na noite da morte do tenente Monteiro, uma alta patente, provavelmente o próprio Pereira de Eça, esteve em sua casa. O episódio mostra até que ponto o estado maior, sediado em Mossâmedes, estava ávido de informações sensíveis da parte de um homem que, por ter trabalhado precisamente nessa zona como topógrafo militar durante vários anos na construção do caminho de ferro, conhecia o terreno como ninguém.
Para que fique completo o relato da guerra com os alemães em Angola, basta dizer que, dois dias depois, tudo tinha acabado com eles, por se terem rendido aos sul-africanos do general Botha, no Sudoeste Africano, hoje Namíbia.
Esta primeira guerra colonial em Angola que começou com o “scramble” que se seguiu à Conferência de Berlim, durou cerca de quarenta anos, desde 1885 até 1925(22,23), serviu para destruir quase completamente a estrutura social que existia, definir as fronteiras daquele que é hoje um país independente e desenvolver a estrutura colonial que durou até 1974-1975. E a guerra acabou, porque as tropas europeias foram substituindo as mulas, os cavalos e os bois, por veículos motorizados(24), e, sobretudo, foram substituindo as carabinas e as espingardas por uma arma temível que, essa, os negros não possuiam – a metralhadora(25). Duvido que haja uma contablização absolutamente credível mas, ao todo, foram, muito provavelmente, centenas de milhares de mortos, a esmagadora maioria deles entre a população negra(26).
Ontem como hoje, todas as guerras têm consequências dramáticas. Em primeiro lugar, para as populações que nelas são forçadamente envolvidas ou delas têm que se defender. Em segundo lugar, para os soldados que para elas são conduzidos, a maior parte das vezes, enganados por uma propaganda ilusória. Em terceiro lugar, sofrem com as guerras as famílias destes soldados. Tal foi, seguramente, o caso da família do tenente Monteiro, que em Angola ficou sepultado, e, em particular, para a sua filha que tão cedo perdeu o pai.
Como afirmou um militar relativamente a outro camarada [JSP], talvez António Ribeiro Monteiro tenha “sido enterrado na cerca de arame farpado junto à muralha”, e lá tenha ficado “esquecido, e hoje ignorado, como tantos outros que por aqueles sertões morreram, faltando saber se com melhor sorte que aqueles que viveram”. De facto, muitos desses soldados sobreviventes continuaram a combater os negros em África ou vieram combater para a Europa, na guerra mundial de 14-18.
Seria necessário esperar cerca de 30 anos, após o fim da primeira guerra colonial em Angola, para se assistir ao início da derrocada do império e das ilusões coloniais. A União Indiana, que tinha conquistado a independência em 1947 (o que só por si devia ter feito meditar Salazar), começou nos anos 50 a reivindicar os territórios que Portugal ocupava – os enclaves de Goa, Damão, Diu, Dadrá e Nagar-Avely.
Em fins de Julho de 1954, forças da União Indiana assaltaram e ocuparam definitivamente os dois pequenos enclaves de Dadrá e Nagar-Avely. A crise política desencadeada então entre os dois países durou cerca de um ano, mas os portugueses foram expulsos definitivamente de Goa, Damão e Diu em 19 de Dezembro de 1961, nas circunstâncias bem conhecidas. A tensão entre Portugal e a União Indiana só terminou em 31 de Dezembro de 1974.
Nesse ano de 1954, a 11 de Agosto, em Portugal, o Movimento Nacional Democrático, cujo presidente era o matemático Ruy Luís Gomes, enviou aos jornais uma “nota oficiosa”(27), um extenso documento, que vale a pena ler, sobre a situação política em Portugal e sobre o que se estava a passar na Índia, condenando a política colonial do governo. Foi o suficiente para que Ruy Luís Gomes, Virgínia Moura, Lobão Vital, José Morgado e Albertino Macedo fossem presos e acusados de traição à pátria(28), ameaçados com cinquenta anos de prisão mais medidas de segurança, e passassem por vários julgamentos até serem finalmente libertados em 1957.
O próprio Ruy Luís Gomes, no seu Curriculum Vitae político [RLG], refere que foi “preso pela PIDE em 19 de Agosto de 1954 por ter, juntamente com os restantes elementos da Comissão Central do MND, elaborado um documento condenando a política colonial do Estado Novo e defendendo a autodeterminação dos Povos, por ocasião de incidentes ocorridos em Goa, Damão e Diu. Foi então acusado de traição à Pátria e julgado em Junho de 1955 no Tribunal plenário do Porto. Foi condenado em 18 meses de prisão. Recorreram da sentença, aguardando em liberdade o resultado do recurso. Anulado o julgamento, recolheu de novo à cadeia em meados de 1956. Novamente julgado em meados de 1957 foi condenado em dois anos de prisão. Mais de metade deste tempo foi passado na Colónia Penal de Santa Cruz do Bispo, em Matosinhos, prisão especialmente destinada a presos comuns de difícil correcção; muitos destes presos eram dementes”.
Na sequência destes acontecimentos, Ruy Luís Gomes, expulso da Universidade desde 1947 e com a vida muito dificultada em Portugal, vai, em Setembro de 1958, exilado, para Bahía Blanca, na Argentina, a convite do seu amigo António Aniceto Monteiro que já lá se encontrava.
A influência mútua destes dois homens é conhecida, tanto no plano político, como no plano científico. António Aniceto Monteiro foi o principal dínamo das iniciativas do Movimento Matemático no que respeita à investigação e contagiou Ruy Luís Gomes. Por sua vez, Ruy Luís Gomes, vindo de uma família com tradições, era aquele que, dos dois, estava mais informado e era mais activo politicamente. Em ambos, o traço comum de um vida inteira de coerência cívica e científica, indestrinçáveis uma da outra.
Em 4 de Fevereiro de 1961, um grupo de angolanos ataca prisões de Luanda, tentando libertar presos políticos dando início, assim, à segunda guerra colonial em Angola – a guerra que conduziu à independência. Um dos muitos objectivos dessa acção, que envolveu cerca de 200 pessoas armadas de catanas e outras armas artesanais, era a libertação da maioria dos presos políticos do processo dos 50 que estavam na Casa de Reclusão Militar e que se suspeitava que iriam ser transferidos em breve para o Campo de Concentração do Tarrafal.
No Brasil, vivia um grande grupo de exilados portugueses, a maioria dos que estavam na América Latina. Entre eles, interessa-me destacar, nesta intervenção, Manuel Sertório e Henrique Galvão. Este último tinha liderado o desvio do navio Santa Maria em 22 de Janeiro de 1961, que muita gente pensava ir aportar a Luanda, mas que acabou por ir para o Recife, no Brasil. Muitos jornalistas de vários países acorreram então à capital de Angola, na expectativa de relatarem a chegada do Santa Maria, tendo sido a possiblidade de uma grande cobertura internacional mais um factor que incentivou o 4 de Fevereiro de 1961. Os resistentes angolanos desejavam chamar a atenção para a grave situação que se vivia naquela colónia, com destaque para o massacre dos camponeses da Baixa de Cassange que estavam a ser bombardeados e mortos, aos milhares, com napalm.
Nenhuma das acções do 4 de Fevereiro teve êxito, mas, pelo menos, conseguiram chamar a atenção do mundo inteiro para o que se passava em Angola. As autoridades coloniais designavam os resistentes africanos de “terroristas” ou, ainda mais depreciativamente, de “turras”. Para os mais racistas, todos os negros eram “terroristas”. No seguimento do 4 de Fevereiro, foi desencadeada a caça generalizada ao “turra” e mais massacres foram perpetrados.
O grupo de exilados no Brasil era politicamente muito heterogéneo. O capitão Henrique Galvão tinha sido um adepto entusiasta de Salazar, mas começou a divergir deste, sem nunca romper com a ideologia que sempre tinha apoiado, nomeadamente na sua componente colonialista.
Na organização da oposição na América Latina, Manuel Sertório, que vivia em São Paulo, era o elemento que fazia a ligação com os dois portugueses de Bahía Blanca, Ruy Luís Gomes e António Aniceto Monteiro.
Assumindo sempre as suas raízes angolanas, como “tendo nascido em Angola”, António Aniceto Monteiro troca com Manuel Sertório, em 1961, algumas cartas [AAM-MS] que visavam a elaboração de uma declaração conjunta de oposicionistas sobre a situação que se vivia na colónia portuguesa.
As quatro cartas que António Monteiro escreveu então a Manuel Sertório, estão marcadas com um sotaque argentino e, aqui e ali, com alguma fina ironia.
Na carta de 23 de Março de 1961, afirma o seguinte
“Creio que não é suficiente condenar o envio de forças armadas para os territórios coloniais e que se deveria também reclamar que se retirem todas as tropas de repressão enviadas nos últimos tempos. Ao mesmo tempo convém aclarar que a responsabilidade de todos os sucessos que ocorram nas colónias recai inteiramente sobre o governo de Portugal e serão uma simples consequência da sua política de repressão, que se pode contrapor à atitude dos diversos movimentos para a independência das colónias que reclamam insistentemente negociações pacíficas”. Termina citando a frase “nenhum povo pode ser livre se oprime outro povo”.
A carta seguinte, de 24 de Abril de 1961, exprime o desapontamento por alterações entretanto introduzidas ao documento, no Brasil, por Henrique Galvão e outros:
“(...) tenho aqui à mão uma declaração sobre o problema colonial, que a Comissão de Inter-Ligação enviou ao Prof. Ruy Gomes em 30 de Março. Trata-se de um documento com uma orientação essencialmente distinta da declaração impressa à qual enviei a minha adesão na carta que lhe escrevi em 23 de Março.
Devo dizer-lhe que não assinarei a declaração de 30 de Março anteriormente indicada, porque o problema da autodeterminação dos povos coloniais está posto em termos ambíguos.
Em primeiro lugar se reconhece o direito à irrestrita autodeterminação, mas logo a seguir se agrega «sob as necessárias garantias de exercício desse direito em condições humanamente progressivas, etc.» o que pode significar, por exemplo, que os povos coloniais terão de esperar mais alguns séculos para que se lhes reconheça esse direito”.
E, mais adiante, António Aniceto Monteiro diz que “o artigo 6º (...) usa o tom dum patrão a falar para um escravo”, para, depois, concluir do seguinte modo:
“sobre o problema da autodeterminação dos povos coloniais não pode haver nenhuma espécie de reticências. Depois de uma política de opressão, escravidão e extermínio que durou séculos o governo iniciou actualmente uma guerra de extermínio em Angola e outras colónias, que é necessário condenar nos termos mais enérgicos apoiando os povos coloniais na sua luta pela independência nacional.”
A terceira carta, de 29 de Maio de 1961, mostra que a redacção final da referida declaração acaba por ser de acordo com a opinião de António Aniceto Monteiro, porque diz a Manuel Sertório: “pode pôr o meu nome entre o das pessoas que assinam a declaração em questão que consta de três pontos”. A parte final da carta revela que ele, em Bahía Blanca, a milhares de quilómetros dos centros de decisão, via mais longe do que Salazar e os seus acólitos:
“A situação em Angola agrava-se cada vez mais. Os jornais já falam de 25 000 mortos (negros); mobilizaram em Portugal, segundo me informa Ruy, a classe de 58. Estamos frente a uma guerra colonial que só terminará com a derrocada do fascismo e a instauração dum governo provisório revolucionário; a menos que se consiga interromper a guerra pela intervenção da ONU”.
A quarta e última carta, de 6 de Junho de 1961, é, como as outras, muito interessante sob o ponto de vista histórico. Destaco a seguinte passagem:
“Há 11 anos que estou completamente isolado das coisas portuguêsas e só agora, desde que está aqui o Ruy, é que tenho mais algumas notícias, além das que leio em Portugal Democrático. De um modo geral penso que no exterior o que é fundamental é apoiar as directivas da frente interna de resistência.
O Galvão acabou por revelar-se completamente como um autêntico colonialista nos 3 artigos que escreveu num diário de São Paulo. Para mim as reticências que ele punha à primeira redacção da declaração tinham um significado perfeitamente claro e por isso mesmo não quiz assinar a segunda redacção”.
Como se vê, estas quatro cartas de António Aniceto Monteiro não podiam ser mais claras.
E, para terminar, direi que o objectivo principal desta minha intervenção foi o de revelar situações e factos históricos pouco conhecidos relacionados com a vida de António Aniceto Monteiro, prestando homenagem a um homem que, apesar de todas as dificuldades, realizou um trabalho científico notável em vários países, sempre ambicionando viver pacificamente, mas nunca virando a cara à luta.
Vêm-me à memória as palavras que António Aniceto Monteiro escreveu a Guido Beck, do Rio de Janeiro, numa carta enviada em 1948: “Também conheço mal a situação na Argentina. Mas seria possível viver em paz, sem ser perseguido pelas minhas opiniões? Deve responder com precisão a esta pergunta, dizendo o que pensa” [AF-AV]. Soube-se, depois, qual foi a resposta que a realidade lhe deu.
Tal como o fez António Aniceto Monteiro há que lutar contra todos os fatalismos e conformismos. Temos que confiar que a luta pelo direito a viver e a trabalhar em paz tem que ser bem sucedida, porque a conquista desse direito é absolutamente necessária.
Por ocasião do seu centenário aqui fica, pois, nesta intervenção, a minha homenagem ao homem bom que, como poeta, assinava com o pseudónimo de “Adrião de Mossâmedes”.
Agradecimentos: António Brotas, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Colégio Militar, Manuela Cruzeiro (Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril), Universidade de Lisboa.
(*) Departamento de Matemática da FCUL e Grupo de Física-Matemática da Universidade de Lisboa (GFMUL), Complexo Interdisciplinar da Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Prof. Gama Pinto, 2, 1649-003 Lisboa, Portugal. O GFMUL é financiado pela Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia.
(1) [RP1], pág. 141.
(2) [RP1], págs. 145 e 146.
(3) [RP1], pág. 153.
(4) [RP1], págs. 143, 144, 148, 149,151,153,161,197.
(5) [RP1], pág. 151.
(6) “É um sueco quem tem a fama de ter levado as primeiras espingardas aos Cuanhamas. Karl Johan Andersson, Notes os Travels in South Africa, Londres, 1875” [RP1], pág. 143. Ver também a pág. 151.
(7) [RP1], pág. 233.
(8) [RP1], págs. 155, 162, 172.
(9) [RP1], pág. 190.
(10) [RP1], pág. 192.
(11) [RP1], pág. 197. De facto, a campanha, que era previsto durar seis meses, durou dez anos. Só no ano em que acabou, houve “819 mortes” entre as tropas portuguesas e “teve algo como 18 500 contos de despesas (...), ou seja, dez vezes mais que o orçamento previsto por Eduardo da Costa em 1904 para a ocupação do Cuanhama!” (pág. 251).
(12) José Augusto Alves Roçadas, nasceu em Vila Real, em 6 de Abril de 1865 e morreu em 28 de Junho de 1926.
(13) [RP1], pág. 197.
(14) José Narciso Antunes d’Andrade Júnior, nasceu em 27 de Dezembro de 1854 no Crato, distrito de Portalegre. Foi promovido a “Coronel para o Estado Maior de Infantaria em 12 de Agosto de 1909, colocado no Regimento de Infantaria nº 11, em Setúbal, em 4 de Setembro do mesmo ano, e no D.R.R. nº 5, em Lisboa, como comandante, em 26 de Outubro de 1910. Faleceu em 4 de Novembro de 1926. [ARM2]
(15) É possível ter uma ideia bastante precisa das datas em que o militar esteve em Angola, em serviço, até 9 de Abril de 1912, porque sempre que isso acontecia o seu tempo de serviço de oficial era aumentado de 50%. A ser assim, esteve em Angola: desde 31 de Julho de 1905 a 27 de Dezembro de 1909; de 16 de Dezembro de 1910 até 31 de Julho de 1911; de 28 de Janeiro até 9 de Abril de 1912. Consequentemente, não esteve, em serviço, em Angola: de 28 de Dezembro de 1909 a 15 de Dezembro de 1910 e de 1 de Agosto de 1911 a 27 de Janeiro de 1912. Não se percebe bem qual era a situação do tenente Monteiro no período que vai de 10 de Abril a 31 de Julho de 1912. Até ao final de 1912, o seu tempo de licença registada foi de 270 dias e o seu tempo de licença por motivo de moléstia e de tratamento nos hospitais foi de 458 dias.
(16) Em 1904 António Ribeiro Monteiro pediu autorização para se candidatar a um concurso para “professores do magistério secundário”. Tinha habilitação para ser “instrutor de ginástica” e é possível que, em 1912 pudesse ensinar, também, outras matérias. Assim, não é de excluir que tivesse sido professor, em Mossâmedes, no ano escolar de 1912-1913.
(17) No caso do tenente Monteiro está todo escrito pelo seu punho, mas havia um formulário impresso que, noutros casos, os militares só tinham que assinar. Foi o caso do coronel José Narciso d’Andrade em 1912 [ARM2].
(18) [RP1], págs. 234-237.
(19) António Júlio da Costa Pereira de Eça, nasceu em 1852 e faleceu em 1917. Em 1914 foi Ministro do Exército.
(20) [RP1], pág. 240.
(21) João Ortigão Peres nasceu em 13 de Março de 1872 em Alcantarilha, Algarve. Foi promovido a Major em 30 de Março de 1912. Em 5 de Março de 1815 partiu para Luanda como Chefe do Estado Maior do General Pereira de Eça. Foi promovido a Tenente-Coronel em 24 de Julho de 1915. Em 9 de Janeiro de 1917, foi nomeado adido militar junto da Legação Militar de Portugal em França, e foi nessa qualidade que escreveu o atestado sobre a morte do tenente Monteiro. Faleceu em 15 de Março de 1918. [ML]
(22) [RP1], págs. 256-259.
(23) “Quanto aos nómadas Cuvales (do grupo dos Hereros), movendo-se entre o Sul e o Centro de Angola, embora em rigor se não possa falar de resistência por parte de povos errantes como eles, teriam em 1940-1941, quinze anos depois dos últimos tiros da pacificação na Lunda, o privilégio de servir de caça numa batida mais que duvidosa” [RP1], pág. 143.
(24) [RP1], pág. 241.
(25) [RP2], contracapa e [RP1], pág. 241.
(26) [RP1], pág. 264.
(27) Ver [PM] ou [MND].
(28) A acusação de “traição à pátria” nunca foi provada em tribunal e não foram condenados por esse motivo. Ver [PM].
Referências
[AAM-CM] Processo individual de António Aniceto Monteiro, Colégio Militar, Lisboa.
[AAM-RUL] Processo individual de António Aniceto Monteiro, Reitoria da Universidade de Lisboa.
[AAM-MS] Cartas entre António Aniceto Monteiro e Manuel Sertório. Espólio de Manuel Sertório, Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril, Coimbra.
“Nenhum povo pode ser livre se oprime outro povo”: carta de 23 de Março de 1961 a propósito do início da guerra em Angola
«Sobre o problema da auto-determinação dos povos coloniais não pode haver nenhuma espécie de reticências»: carta de 24 de Abril de 1961
«Sobre o problema da auto-determinação dos povos coloniais não pode haver nenhuma espécie de reticências»: carta de 24 de Abril de 1961
«Estamos frente a uma guerra colonial que só terminará com a derrocada do fascismo»: carta de 29 de Maio de 1961
«Penso que no exterior o que é fundamental é apoiar as directivas da frente interna de resistência»: carta de 6 de Julho de 1961
[AF-AV] Augusto J. S. Fitas e António A. P. Videira: Cartas entre Guido Beck e cientistas portugueses. Lisboa, Instituto Piaget (2004).
[ARM1] Processo individual de António Ribeiro Monteiro, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
[ARM2] Processo individual de José Narciso Antunes d’Andrade Júnior, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
«Penso que no exterior o que é fundamental é apoiar as directivas da frente interna de resistência»: carta de 6 de Julho de 1961
[AF-AV] Augusto J. S. Fitas e António A. P. Videira: Cartas entre Guido Beck e cientistas portugueses. Lisboa, Instituto Piaget (2004).
[ARM1] Processo individual de António Ribeiro Monteiro, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
[ARM2] Processo individual de José Narciso Antunes d’Andrade Júnior, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
Relatório do Coronel José Narciso d'Andrade, de 5 de Novembro de 1910
O Coronel José Narciso d'Andrade
[ARM3] Processo individual de José Augusto Alves Roçadas, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
[JSP] João Sarmento Pimentel, Memórias do Capitão. Editorial Inova, Porto, 1974.
O Coronel José Narciso d'Andrade
[ARM3] Processo individual de José Augusto Alves Roçadas, Arquivo Histórico Militar, Lisboa.
[JSP] João Sarmento Pimentel, Memórias do Capitão. Editorial Inova, Porto, 1974.
João Sarmento Pimentel, Memórias do Capitão. Editorial Inova, Porto, 1974
[ML] Miguel Lomelino, Biografia do meu Bisavô Paterno, Coronel João Ortigão Peres.
[MND] Nota oficiosa do MND, “Jornal de Notícias” de 1 de Agosto de 1974.
[ML] Miguel Lomelino, Biografia do meu Bisavô Paterno, Coronel João Ortigão Peres.
[MND] Nota oficiosa do MND, “Jornal de Notícias” de 1 de Agosto de 1974.
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 [espólio de Corino de Andrade]
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 sobre os acontecimentos ocorridos em Goa, Damão e Diu (O caso da Índia)
[PM] Paulo Morgado, “A Poesia está na Rua” com o Professor Ruy Luís Gomes e os seus Companheiros. Campo das Letras, Porto, 2007 (em edição).
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 sobre os acontecimentos ocorridos em Goa, Damão e Diu (O caso da Índia)
[PM] Paulo Morgado, “A Poesia está na Rua” com o Professor Ruy Luís Gomes e os seus Companheiros. Campo das Letras, Porto, 2007 (em edição).
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 [espólio de Corino de Andrade]
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 sobre os acontecimentos ocorridos em Goa, Damão e Diu (O caso da Índia)
[RLG] Ruy Luís Gomes, Curriculum Vitae político. Espólio arquivado na FCUP.
"Nota oficiosa" do MND de 11 de Agosto de 1954 sobre os acontecimentos ocorridos em Goa, Damão e Diu (O caso da Índia)
[RLG] Ruy Luís Gomes, Curriculum Vitae político. Espólio arquivado na FCUP.
CURRICULUM VITAE POLÍTICO de Ruy Luís Gomes
[RP1] René Pélissier, História das Campanhas de Angola – Resistência e Revoltas 1845-1941, 2º vol. Editorial Estampa, Lisboa, 1997.
[RP1] René Pélissier, História das Campanhas de Angola – Resistência e Revoltas 1845-1941, 2º vol. Editorial Estampa, Lisboa, 1997.
[RP2] René Pélissier, As Campanhas Coloniais de Portugal – 1844-1941. Editorial Estampa, Lisboa, 2006.
quarta-feira, 28 de março de 2007
Angola
(com informações geográficas)
*
António Aniceto Monteiro nasceu em Mossâmedes, Angola, em 31 de Maio de 1907. Angola era a sua terra natal. Mossâmedes era a designação desssa época, mais tarde (anos 20?) mudada para Moçâmedes. O nome depois da independência passou a ser Namibe. Os oito primeiros anos da sua vida, até à morte do pai, em 1915, passou-os o menino António Aniceto em pleno cenário de guerra. A mesma guerra que acabaria por matar o pai, tenente de infantaria, deixando uma viúva e dois órfãos.
Aqui serão colocadas ligações que podem ter interesse para a compreensão da História de Angola e da vida de António Aniceto Monteiro:
1) Angola - parte de Country Studies (USA).
...
Expansion and the Berlin Conference
SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST, AND DEVELOPMENT
The Demographic Situation
Military CampaignsAdministration and Development
ANGOLA UNDER THE SALAZAR REGIME
Angola under the New State
Salazar's Racial Politics
RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM
...
2) Direcçao Nacional dos Caminhos de Ferro - Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera (em italiano).
Aqui serão colocadas ligações que podem ter interesse para a compreensão da História de Angola e da vida de António Aniceto Monteiro:
1) Angola - parte de Country Studies (USA).
...
Expansion and the Berlin Conference
SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST, AND DEVELOPMENT
The Demographic Situation
Military CampaignsAdministration and Development
ANGOLA UNDER THE SALAZAR REGIME
Angola under the New State
Salazar's Racial Politics
RISE OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM
...
2) Direcçao Nacional dos Caminhos de Ferro - Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera (em italiano).
3) Ideologia nacional dos brancos angolanos, por Fernando Pimenta [PDF]
segunda-feira, 19 de março de 2007
domingo, 18 de março de 2007
Sul de Angola
Militares Portugueses no Lubango, Janeiro de 1915(...)
Em 1915, depois de desembarcar em Moçâmedes, a expedição de Pereira d’Eça subiu ao planalto e prosseguiu para Leste, mantendo-se a alguns dias de marcha do Cunene, para evitar incidentes na preocupante fronteira com a colónia alemã do Sudoeste Africano.
Nas deslocações de uma coluna militar, a cavalaria tinha por missão explorar o terreno na vanguarda e nos flancos, em constante movimentação, procurando evitar que a infantaria fosse surpreendida.
(...)
O itinerário da expedição tinha sido preparado pelo “serviço de etapas”, fixando os locais de abastecimento, em especial os cursos de água, onde homens e animais poderiam dessedentar-se. No entanto uma seca rigorosa gorou as expectativas, e depois de atravessarem vários leitos secos, houve que inflectir para o Cunene. Foi uma longa marcha, sempre a passo para evitar a transpiração, mas sem paragens, até porque nos últimos quilómetros nada detinha os animais, nem os fazia desviar do caminho do rio. Apesar de toda a sua fidelidade, os cavalos podiam virar a cabeça, apertados pelo freio dos cavaleiros, e tentavam acelerar o passo na direcção da água que já pressentiam, e a que conseguiram chegar nos limites da desidratação.
A cavalaria era uma arma fundamental nas vastidões africanas, mas seguindo o ditado português de que “quem não tem cão caça com gato”, quando não havia cavalos, os dragões montavam muares. Naquelas condições a sua segurança era dramaticamente reduzida, porque a vantagem da cavalaria era a rapidez. Com as mulas não se pode andar a “mata cavalos”, porque quando estão cansadas empinam-se, escoucinham, mas não avançam. Os dragões que só conseguiam mulas para as suas missões de patrulha despediam-se em grande pranto dos camaradas, porque dificilmente conseguiriam regressar.
Reagrupada e reabastecida a expedição, foi decidido que só uma progressão muito rápida sobre os objectivos conseguiria surpreender o inimigo, e concluir com sucesso a expedição. Rapidez significava naquelas circunstâncias, significava andar a mais de 30 quilómetros por dia, que era a velocidade de transmissão das mensagens dos “tantans” africanos. Assim os soldados, subalimentados e desidratados, foram obrigados a uma marcha forçada, que provocava frequentes desfalecimentos.
Certamente havia macas, mas não havia maqueiros, e o Dr. Monteiro d’Oliveira, movimentando-se na rectaguarda, recolhia os soldados desfalecidos, atravessava-os no cavalo, e levava-os até um carro de bagagem , onde ficavam estendidos o resto do dia. Como medicamentação recebiam um remédio precioso pela sua escassez: ¼ de água das pedras. A terapêutica era eficaz a 100% e no dia seguinte os soldados já marchavam ao lado dos camaradas.
A pronta recuperação de tantas baixas acabou por ser notada pelo general Pereira d’Eça, que mais tarde exarou um louvor ao tenente-médico António Monteiro d’Oliveira.
Finalmente a vila de N’giva (futura vila Pereira d’Eça) surgiu à vista da coluna. Era um dos principais objectivos da missão. Os dragões carregaram, a população fugiu, e quando a infantaria chegou a embala estava abandonada. A tomada de NGiva foi um sucesso, não só pelo reduzido número de baixas, mas também pela captura de documentação, nomeadamente uma curiosa carta de um missionário luterano, desaparecido na confusão do ataque, que comunicava aos seus superiores no Sudoeste Africano que a coluna portuguesa tinha sido totalmente derrotada...
[Copiado de Antigamente... ]
The Conquest of Southern Angola
Deepest South
From 1885 until 1915, the south of Angola was war. War in all forms and for all reasons known in Portuguese Africa - from cattle-thieving raids and ethnic revolts to international armed conflict - with such intensity and participation of European contingents seldom seen south of the Sahara. It would become, from 1904, the proving ground of a not so small part of the Portuguese Officers Corp and the touchstone of their ability to conquer. In short, Southern Angola would be the Indochina, Madagascar the Sudan and Morocco of a Portuguese colonial Renaissance.
For the more enlightened Africans, specially some Ovambo chiefs, the way-out seemed unavoidable. Sooner or later the German machineguns to the south, and the Portuguese to the north, would riddle with bullets their last independent nations. But the debility and hesitations of the Portuguese administration would allow them one last hope of avoiding the dreaded outcome. This was not a childish miscalculation, for at least one Ovambo nation, the Kwanyama, would keep total suzerainty over its territory until the summer of 1915, while the powerful Ovimbundo kingdoms of Central Angola had succumbed thirteen years earlier.
First Attempts
For the more enlightened Africans, specially some Ovambo chiefs, the way-out seemed unavoidable. Sooner or later the German machineguns to the south, and the Portuguese to the north, would riddle with bullets their last independent nations. But the debility and hesitations of the Portuguese administration would allow them one last hope of avoiding the dreaded outcome. This was not a childish miscalculation, for at least one Ovambo nation, the Kwanyama, would keep total suzerainty over its territory until the summer of 1915, while the powerful Ovimbundo kingdoms of Central Angola had succumbed thirteen years earlier.
First Attempts
This part of Angola, that spreads from the sea to the Cubango river is located in the so called "Savannah Region", stretching inland into deepest Africa, across the continent, until it reaches the East Coast. Poked by baobab trees, thickets and small bush woods, it's a land rich in cattle that grazes in tender pastures called chanas, confined to the south by the "hunting territories" criss-crossed, at this time, not only by pombeiros ( Portuguese traders or salesmen who travelled the hinterland: pombe), but also by British, American, Brazilian, German and Scandinavian professional hunters, French missionaries and Finnish Lutherans! Further still are the deserts and barren lands which characterise Southwest Africa. The most predominant ethnic group populating the area is the Bantu, which migrated from the north and are represented by the Ovambo, Herero and Nyaneca-Humbe, with the non-Bantu formed by the Hottentot-Bushmen and Va-twa.
Although the Portuguese had made their presence felt since 1641, the first real attempt to colonise the south was made in 1785, when the Governor General of Angola sent two expeditions, one by sea and another by land, who established the settlement of Mossamedes on the coast. From 1843 until 1857, Portuguese, Brazilian and some German settlers established themselves not only in Mossamedes but further inland, climbing the 1800 meters of the Chela mountain ridge to reach the Huila plateau. In 1857 the Huila fort was attacked by 8000 warriors of the Nano people, inhabitants of Central Angola, in the region south of Bihe. They were repulsed by a small force of regulars and settlers after a four days battle. The Nano would strike again in force in 1860, seizing cattle and capturing people, among them some settlers that would be rescued latter. The fort was once again besieged, and the Major in command was decapitated on the barrel of a cannon when his troops were defeated after a failed sortie. By 1867, all garrisons were abandoned with the exception of the half destroyed Huila fort, that was to hold the plateau on its own.
The Cape Dutch
Although the Portuguese had made their presence felt since 1641, the first real attempt to colonise the south was made in 1785, when the Governor General of Angola sent two expeditions, one by sea and another by land, who established the settlement of Mossamedes on the coast. From 1843 until 1857, Portuguese, Brazilian and some German settlers established themselves not only in Mossamedes but further inland, climbing the 1800 meters of the Chela mountain ridge to reach the Huila plateau. In 1857 the Huila fort was attacked by 8000 warriors of the Nano people, inhabitants of Central Angola, in the region south of Bihe. They were repulsed by a small force of regulars and settlers after a four days battle. The Nano would strike again in force in 1860, seizing cattle and capturing people, among them some settlers that would be rescued latter. The fort was once again besieged, and the Major in command was decapitated on the barrel of a cannon when his troops were defeated after a failed sortie. By 1867, all garrisons were abandoned with the exception of the half destroyed Huila fort, that was to hold the plateau on its own.
The Cape Dutch
On August 21 of 1879 a Boer trek arrived in Humbe. A delegation sent to the soba (chief) Chaungo was attacked, and on August 25 the Boers stormed his libata (African village) killing 25 people and putting him on the run. The Governor of Mossamedes which was informed of the incident six months latter, quickly invited the Boers to settle on the plateau. In September of 1880 they were given permission to settle an almost independent colony in Humpata. The government gave them 200 acres per family, and 277 Cape Dutch (name given to them by the Portuguese), 50 servants and Bastardos (Boer and African half-castes) under the authority of Jacobus Frederik Botha, three-hundred rifles in all, almost tripled the total white population on the plateau. Two new vectors of conquest and, specially, trade were therefor introduced: The horse and, even more important, the wagon. With the introduction of 100 horses and 2000 oxen, Portuguese trade got the autonomy that it longed for.
With a calculated risk, the Governor of Mossamedes requested their assistance to reoccupy Humbe. For this task he could gather 100 native soldiers but only 50 of them had rifles. Some time after September 1880, a Captain with 10 soldiers took possession of the fort, that by this time laid in ruins. Due to a lack of funds the Governor was forced to appoint a local merchant government-delegate, with the task of building a new fort at his own expenses.
By January 1881, fifty-seven Boer families had established in the Humpata colony, now named St. Januario. A detachment of troops was placed there under the command of the young and bright 2nd lieutenant Artur de Paiva, which latter married with one of Frederik Botha's daughters, and in November 1881, the Boers were given Portuguese citizenship, without real effect. The Boers would become indispensable auxiliaries in the subjugation of Humbe before 1900, and in the campaigns of Central Angola.
Settlers, Missionaries, Traders and Explorers
With a calculated risk, the Governor of Mossamedes requested their assistance to reoccupy Humbe. For this task he could gather 100 native soldiers but only 50 of them had rifles. Some time after September 1880, a Captain with 10 soldiers took possession of the fort, that by this time laid in ruins. Due to a lack of funds the Governor was forced to appoint a local merchant government-delegate, with the task of building a new fort at his own expenses.
By January 1881, fifty-seven Boer families had established in the Humpata colony, now named St. Januario. A detachment of troops was placed there under the command of the young and bright 2nd lieutenant Artur de Paiva, which latter married with one of Frederik Botha's daughters, and in November 1881, the Boers were given Portuguese citizenship, without real effect. The Boers would become indispensable auxiliaries in the subjugation of Humbe before 1900, and in the campaigns of Central Angola.
Settlers, Missionaries, Traders and Explorers
The period 1880-1881, which saw the beginning of as new era in the South, ended with the settlement of a French Spiritian Mission in Huila, under the relentless efforts of Father Duparquet. Although being foreigners and therefor seen as suspicious characters by the Portuguese, they turned out to be not only the Hearts & Minds on the plateau but, being Catholics of Alsacian extraction, became the hidden sentinels against the German advance from the south.
The new Portuguese policy for the plateau was to submit and pacify the local tribes in order to obtain the most fertile lands. In April 1882 a Portuguese farmer, captain of irregulars, with a small invading force of native infantry and African auxiliaries was attacked and defeated by the soba of Lubango. Although victorious, the soba had "the good taste" of not waiting for the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements. So was this fertile land "freed" from its inhabitants. This search for an healthy climate and good farmlands, adequate for European agriculture, would be one constant in the southern colonisation.
To balance the Boer influence on the plateau, which numbered 325 by 1883, the local authorities decided to insert 41 survivors of the Portuguese settlement of Pungo Andongo (near Luanda). By 1886, they had all but dispersed or returned to Europe. In 1884 another contingent of 42, this time from Madeira, established a colony near the Boer settlement. On 19th January 1885, 222 settlers arrived in Lubango. In August a further 349 settlers from Madeira went to Humpata and, from there, marched on with the previous 42 to establish the settlement of S. Pedro da Chibia. In all, by the end of 1885, Southern Angola had received 643 new Portuguese settlers. On the other hand, the Pilgrim-Fathers of 1849-1851, around 500 settlers at this time, had established and maintained 95 farms, from the coast to the hinterland. With this settlers, however, came many of the undesirables, unemployed and vagrants who would roam the hinterland as funantes (Portuguese merchants) building small empires, with brandy in one hand and the sjambok (Boer large whip) on the other, and raging war by private enterprise.
On March 10, 1884, the Portuguese explorers Roberto Ivens and Hermenegildo Capelo, who had made several scientific explorations across Angola between 1877-1880, arrived in Mossamedes. Their mission was not only geographical but also political. They were instructed to subject the Kwanyama and to obtain further information on German activities in Ovamboland. In seven months they would cross 3000 miles of African territory from the Atlantic coast to the Indian Ocean. When they finally arrived in Quelimane, Mozambique, of the 124 men which had began the expedition, only 56 were still barely alive.
Because the plough was not enough to show Portuguese suzerainty, the governor-general of Angola, Ferreira do Amaral, sent the sword as well. In September 1883, the governor of Mossamedes Nunes da Matta, went to Humbe with 30 African soldiers and four artillery pieces to reorganise what he had advised to abandon sixteen years earlier. In three years the Portuguese had re-established control over the southerly domains. Well...not quite. In June 1885 a dispute over the election of the new Kwanyama soba led to an attack on white hunters and the French catholic mission, which resulted in the death of Father Delpuech and one friar. Weyulu, the new soba, who could raise a force of 3000 men armed with Martini-Henry's and Wastley-Richards, no longer had the European moderating hand, able to influence his despotic temperament. Though some feared a wave of terror from the Kwanyama, Nunes da Matta didn't believe that the Humbe would rebel. He was to be tragically proven wrong.
The Humbe Revolts
First Revolt 1885-1886
The new Portuguese policy for the plateau was to submit and pacify the local tribes in order to obtain the most fertile lands. In April 1882 a Portuguese farmer, captain of irregulars, with a small invading force of native infantry and African auxiliaries was attacked and defeated by the soba of Lubango. Although victorious, the soba had "the good taste" of not waiting for the arrival of Portuguese reinforcements. So was this fertile land "freed" from its inhabitants. This search for an healthy climate and good farmlands, adequate for European agriculture, would be one constant in the southern colonisation.
To balance the Boer influence on the plateau, which numbered 325 by 1883, the local authorities decided to insert 41 survivors of the Portuguese settlement of Pungo Andongo (near Luanda). By 1886, they had all but dispersed or returned to Europe. In 1884 another contingent of 42, this time from Madeira, established a colony near the Boer settlement. On 19th January 1885, 222 settlers arrived in Lubango. In August a further 349 settlers from Madeira went to Humpata and, from there, marched on with the previous 42 to establish the settlement of S. Pedro da Chibia. In all, by the end of 1885, Southern Angola had received 643 new Portuguese settlers. On the other hand, the Pilgrim-Fathers of 1849-1851, around 500 settlers at this time, had established and maintained 95 farms, from the coast to the hinterland. With this settlers, however, came many of the undesirables, unemployed and vagrants who would roam the hinterland as funantes (Portuguese merchants) building small empires, with brandy in one hand and the sjambok (Boer large whip) on the other, and raging war by private enterprise.
On March 10, 1884, the Portuguese explorers Roberto Ivens and Hermenegildo Capelo, who had made several scientific explorations across Angola between 1877-1880, arrived in Mossamedes. Their mission was not only geographical but also political. They were instructed to subject the Kwanyama and to obtain further information on German activities in Ovamboland. In seven months they would cross 3000 miles of African territory from the Atlantic coast to the Indian Ocean. When they finally arrived in Quelimane, Mozambique, of the 124 men which had began the expedition, only 56 were still barely alive.
Because the plough was not enough to show Portuguese suzerainty, the governor-general of Angola, Ferreira do Amaral, sent the sword as well. In September 1883, the governor of Mossamedes Nunes da Matta, went to Humbe with 30 African soldiers and four artillery pieces to reorganise what he had advised to abandon sixteen years earlier. In three years the Portuguese had re-established control over the southerly domains. Well...not quite. In June 1885 a dispute over the election of the new Kwanyama soba led to an attack on white hunters and the French catholic mission, which resulted in the death of Father Delpuech and one friar. Weyulu, the new soba, who could raise a force of 3000 men armed with Martini-Henry's and Wastley-Richards, no longer had the European moderating hand, able to influence his despotic temperament. Though some feared a wave of terror from the Kwanyama, Nunes da Matta didn't believe that the Humbe would rebel. He was to be tragically proven wrong.
The Humbe Revolts
First Revolt 1885-1886
This conflict, presents itself as a typical example of a recurring opposition between local traders and Portuguese military, and specially has an example of the transfer of fiscal power in the hinterland. The funantes were complaining since February 1885 that the Humbe robbed them and that Chaungo, who refused to pay taxes, had forbidden his subjects any contact with the fort and all whites, except those from the mission. They explained to the authorities that the 60 men garrison was too weak to protect them from armed assaults, and that only recently had Chaungo been forced to stop collecting a tribute that he traditionally imposed on traders. In June 1885, Nunes da Matta sent 120 African soldiers and auxiliaries to re-establish order but, the lieutenant in command, for reasons unknown, retreated and didn't force Chaungo to pay indemnity for damages.
The new fort commander, captain Pedro Moreira da Fonseca, was left all alone with his troop detachment during the summer. On October 31st, Chaungo took up arms, attacking trading posts and the fort, which resisted well though lacking ammunition. Chaungo requested assistance from the Kwanyama and Kwamato. The fear of a Humbe and Ovambo coalition lay in the horizon.
A sate of war was declared in Humbe on September 16th, wile captain Moreira da Fonseca entrenched behind the adobe walls of the fort. It was the peak of fever season which prostrated civilians and African soldiers alike. Seeing everything crumbling down around him, Clemente de Andrade captain of irregulars, merchant and builder of the fort, the man whom the authorities had named government-delegate of Humbe, decided to catch Chaungo with a light column. On November 10th, he set forth with around 34 native soldiers and 24 African auxiliaries to take Chaungo's embala (The tribal capital and chief's residence. A kraal). The Humbes observed the columns advance but, made no attempts to oppose it. The deserted village was pillaged and burned, wile the commander was unable to prevent the soldiery from getting drunk with macau, the local beer. On the way back the column was ambushed at Quiloba. The askaris who had only bad ammunition left, were literally pined to the ground by the Humbes assegai. It was the end. Of the 64 men in the column 52 were killed, including the commander. A search-party of traders and askaris found only stripped decapitated bodies lying about. It was the first time that the Portuguese lost that many troops in Southern Angola. In Huila, the reinforcements were being organised with despairing slowness. Governor Nunes da Matta, who fought with a chronicle shortage of manpower, was finally able to assemble a column of 93 African infantrymen, 38 Boers, 94 Herero and Bushmen and 150 Ovimbundo, totalling 420 men with two cannons and twenty wagons.
The column set out on December 4th. The Humbe attacked at Tchicusse and resistance became stronger as the column neared the fort, which was reached two weeks later. The proverbial burning of villages began. The lack of fire arms was badly felt among the insurgents, and they were finally defeated on open ground at Jamba on December 21st. Chaungo escaped, but it was military impossible to capture him with a column that withered away with sickness.
Even more serious was the abandonment of the column by the Boers and settlers who went home to rest. The hungry soldiers were left alone until March 1886 when a fresh detachment of 60 soldiers arrived from Huila with ammunitions. On March 13th the Portuguese, with 220 native soldiers and African auxiliaries, defeated the Humbes at Cafuntuca. This afforded an opportunity to take many prisoners and the most precious spoil of war in the south: 500 cattle heads. By May this inglorious and fruitless seven months "war" ended in human and financial breakdown.
In November 1886, around 400 Hottentots, unsurpassed cattle thieves which are believed to have followed the Boer treks, started to raid the Humbe, Gambos and Huila districts. The Portuguese authorities suspected that the British traders in Damaraland were arming them and buying the stolen cattle. In order to chase the mounted Hottentots, an irregular squadron was raised at the end of 1887 made of deportees and settlers.
From 1886 to 1890 the settlers continued their migration to the hinterland, which resulted in the usual attrition with the indigenous people. In the Gambos, the commander of the fort had too few soldiers to have any real authority. In fact it were three local traders, beneficiaries of the wealth of the region, kingmakers who exploited the rivalries between clans and then bought the cattle and workers from the winners, that trailing the guns and soldiers from the fort had the mission to control and pacify the road to Humbe.
The new fort commander, captain Pedro Moreira da Fonseca, was left all alone with his troop detachment during the summer. On October 31st, Chaungo took up arms, attacking trading posts and the fort, which resisted well though lacking ammunition. Chaungo requested assistance from the Kwanyama and Kwamato. The fear of a Humbe and Ovambo coalition lay in the horizon.
A sate of war was declared in Humbe on September 16th, wile captain Moreira da Fonseca entrenched behind the adobe walls of the fort. It was the peak of fever season which prostrated civilians and African soldiers alike. Seeing everything crumbling down around him, Clemente de Andrade captain of irregulars, merchant and builder of the fort, the man whom the authorities had named government-delegate of Humbe, decided to catch Chaungo with a light column. On November 10th, he set forth with around 34 native soldiers and 24 African auxiliaries to take Chaungo's embala (The tribal capital and chief's residence. A kraal). The Humbes observed the columns advance but, made no attempts to oppose it. The deserted village was pillaged and burned, wile the commander was unable to prevent the soldiery from getting drunk with macau, the local beer. On the way back the column was ambushed at Quiloba. The askaris who had only bad ammunition left, were literally pined to the ground by the Humbes assegai. It was the end. Of the 64 men in the column 52 were killed, including the commander. A search-party of traders and askaris found only stripped decapitated bodies lying about. It was the first time that the Portuguese lost that many troops in Southern Angola. In Huila, the reinforcements were being organised with despairing slowness. Governor Nunes da Matta, who fought with a chronicle shortage of manpower, was finally able to assemble a column of 93 African infantrymen, 38 Boers, 94 Herero and Bushmen and 150 Ovimbundo, totalling 420 men with two cannons and twenty wagons.
The column set out on December 4th. The Humbe attacked at Tchicusse and resistance became stronger as the column neared the fort, which was reached two weeks later. The proverbial burning of villages began. The lack of fire arms was badly felt among the insurgents, and they were finally defeated on open ground at Jamba on December 21st. Chaungo escaped, but it was military impossible to capture him with a column that withered away with sickness.
Even more serious was the abandonment of the column by the Boers and settlers who went home to rest. The hungry soldiers were left alone until March 1886 when a fresh detachment of 60 soldiers arrived from Huila with ammunitions. On March 13th the Portuguese, with 220 native soldiers and African auxiliaries, defeated the Humbes at Cafuntuca. This afforded an opportunity to take many prisoners and the most precious spoil of war in the south: 500 cattle heads. By May this inglorious and fruitless seven months "war" ended in human and financial breakdown.
In November 1886, around 400 Hottentots, unsurpassed cattle thieves which are believed to have followed the Boer treks, started to raid the Humbe, Gambos and Huila districts. The Portuguese authorities suspected that the British traders in Damaraland were arming them and buying the stolen cattle. In order to chase the mounted Hottentots, an irregular squadron was raised at the end of 1887 made of deportees and settlers.
From 1886 to 1890 the settlers continued their migration to the hinterland, which resulted in the usual attrition with the indigenous people. In the Gambos, the commander of the fort had too few soldiers to have any real authority. In fact it were three local traders, beneficiaries of the wealth of the region, kingmakers who exploited the rivalries between clans and then bought the cattle and workers from the winners, that trailing the guns and soldiers from the fort had the mission to control and pacify the road to Humbe.
The Second Revolt, 1891
Chaungo who had escaped in 1886, was finally captured in 1888. The new soba Tchioa elected by the Portuguese was much hated among the locals. He couldn't conjure up rain, and nothing could best demonstrate his illegitimacy, in a semi-arid herdsmen country cursed with a long drought. There was another claimant to the throne named Luhuna, who had the ability to make rain when ever he wanted, and after escaping several attempts made by the authorities to capture him, attacked Tchioa's embala on 5th of March 1891. Tchioa took refuge on the fort, who had only thirty rifles for its defence. After being elected soba by the Humbe, Luhuna submitted the rest of the region from March until May of 1891.
Although in 1891 the Portuguese had their cavalry squadron, many of the troopers didn't know how to ride. Given the task of organising a relief column, major Justiniano Padrel, the energetic commander of the 4th Caçadores* Battalion followed the district commander, captain Luna de Carvalho's advise and hired the services of a local mercenary chief named Tom, a Tswana, who rented his services at a lower price than the Boers (only half of the stolen cattle). This mercenaries of varied ethnic background (Herero, Bastardos, Bushmen, Berg-Damara, etc.), that roamed from the Gambos to the Kaokoveld (South West Africa), allied themselves to the highest bidder, which weren't necessarily the Portuguese authorities. But since they refused to follow orders from others than the Boers, Padrel was forced to request their help. For their services the Boers demanded double wages and the presence of a doctor.
*The Caçadores (hunters, chasseurs, jägers), are light native infantry troops. At this time they were organised in battalions but latter dissolved and re-organised by companies. The ç in Portuguese is read like ss, (cassadores, Rossadas, etc.).
On the 8th of May 1891, the expedition set out from the Gambos with 60 askaris, 60 Boers and mounted settlers, 20 Bastardos, 44 Berg-Damara, 30 Bushmen, 500 Himbas (Herrero) seven wagons a Krupp cannon and one machinegun. The column was attacked on the 14th at Tchipelongo but the auxiliaries repulsed the assailants. The Portuguese burned every village on the way, and reached the fort on the 16th. Defeated by the Portuguese artillery on the 20th and 25th of May, Luhuna had no choice but to escape south to Donguena (33 miles south of Humbe), inhabited by a particularly aggressive branch of Humbe. Padrel went in his pursuit and after five days in Donguena, had inflicted 200 casualties and captured over 3000 cattle heads. The Humbe, in panic sued for peace but the warring faction had crossed the Cunene river into Kwamato. Between the 20th and 25th of June, Padrel, then turned to the north-east regions to force the remaining Humbe to submit, taking women and children to the fort to be ransomed for cattle. But Luhuna was still at large, so Padrel decided to advance against his allies the unsubmitted Kwamato.
To engage the first Portuguese-Ovambo war, without the prior consent of the district governor, was a serious decision. The Kwamatos, because of their modern rifles, were feared by all, including their more numerous neighbours the Kwanyama. Padrel received the support of 3500 Kwanyama auxiliaries sent by King Weyulu which arrived at the fort on July 9. By now he had 4600 men under his command. With two guns, and commanding the most important expedition mounted in Southern Angola till this date, the self confident Padrel forded the Cunene at Pembe. Without delay, he marched on Big Kwamato, soba Iquera's embala, were Luhuna had taken refuge. Then, suddenly everything fell apart. The region is a vast plane pocked with bush woods that offer good protection for shooters. Commanded by Iquera's son, the Kwamatos and their allies, concentrated around Padrel's men, and on the night of the 12th to the 13th fell upon the Portuguese camp at Dombeafungue with around 10 000(?) men. The battle raged for nine hours. The Portuguese claimed 200 Kwamato casualties against seven wounded and two dead Kwanyama on their side. But the Krupp had been disabled with a broken axis. On the 13th, 2500 Kwanyama left the column. Of the other African auxiliaries only the Himba showed any intention of staying until the end.
Without the possibility of being reinforced, all officers agreed that the column should retreat or face annihilation. First simulating an advance, the column retreated in good order and under fire for seven hours. The askaris had to charge twice before they could all reach the Cunene river by 3 p.m. of the 13th. Padrel had lost 11 dead and 31 wounded, many by cold-steel. The column had been saved by Padrel's and his staff's sang-froid. At Dombeafungue the Portuguese had to face an Ovambo coalition that in spite having heavy losses (around 800 casualties), did no sue for peace and was prepared to resist.
With most of Luhuna's chiefs captured the war was over. It had lasted five months. Of the 6632 captured cattle heads half was divided among the volunteers and half went to the Crown. Padrel left Humbe on the 1st of August 1891.
But the south still belonged to the ones who could raid it or had enough firepower to cross the vast wild hinterland, such as the Hottentot and the Boers or the British and Scandinavian hunters who sold huge quantities of arms and ammunition to the Kwanyama. For a month, from the 4th of January until the 5th of February 1893, a group of Boers and 9 Portuguese cavalrymen had to chase another Hottentot raid, killing thirty and retrieving 500 cattle and 6 horses.
Although in 1891 the Portuguese had their cavalry squadron, many of the troopers didn't know how to ride. Given the task of organising a relief column, major Justiniano Padrel, the energetic commander of the 4th Caçadores* Battalion followed the district commander, captain Luna de Carvalho's advise and hired the services of a local mercenary chief named Tom, a Tswana, who rented his services at a lower price than the Boers (only half of the stolen cattle). This mercenaries of varied ethnic background (Herero, Bastardos, Bushmen, Berg-Damara, etc.), that roamed from the Gambos to the Kaokoveld (South West Africa), allied themselves to the highest bidder, which weren't necessarily the Portuguese authorities. But since they refused to follow orders from others than the Boers, Padrel was forced to request their help. For their services the Boers demanded double wages and the presence of a doctor.
*The Caçadores (hunters, chasseurs, jägers), are light native infantry troops. At this time they were organised in battalions but latter dissolved and re-organised by companies. The ç in Portuguese is read like ss, (cassadores, Rossadas, etc.).
On the 8th of May 1891, the expedition set out from the Gambos with 60 askaris, 60 Boers and mounted settlers, 20 Bastardos, 44 Berg-Damara, 30 Bushmen, 500 Himbas (Herrero) seven wagons a Krupp cannon and one machinegun. The column was attacked on the 14th at Tchipelongo but the auxiliaries repulsed the assailants. The Portuguese burned every village on the way, and reached the fort on the 16th. Defeated by the Portuguese artillery on the 20th and 25th of May, Luhuna had no choice but to escape south to Donguena (33 miles south of Humbe), inhabited by a particularly aggressive branch of Humbe. Padrel went in his pursuit and after five days in Donguena, had inflicted 200 casualties and captured over 3000 cattle heads. The Humbe, in panic sued for peace but the warring faction had crossed the Cunene river into Kwamato. Between the 20th and 25th of June, Padrel, then turned to the north-east regions to force the remaining Humbe to submit, taking women and children to the fort to be ransomed for cattle. But Luhuna was still at large, so Padrel decided to advance against his allies the unsubmitted Kwamato.
To engage the first Portuguese-Ovambo war, without the prior consent of the district governor, was a serious decision. The Kwamatos, because of their modern rifles, were feared by all, including their more numerous neighbours the Kwanyama. Padrel received the support of 3500 Kwanyama auxiliaries sent by King Weyulu which arrived at the fort on July 9. By now he had 4600 men under his command. With two guns, and commanding the most important expedition mounted in Southern Angola till this date, the self confident Padrel forded the Cunene at Pembe. Without delay, he marched on Big Kwamato, soba Iquera's embala, were Luhuna had taken refuge. Then, suddenly everything fell apart. The region is a vast plane pocked with bush woods that offer good protection for shooters. Commanded by Iquera's son, the Kwamatos and their allies, concentrated around Padrel's men, and on the night of the 12th to the 13th fell upon the Portuguese camp at Dombeafungue with around 10 000(?) men. The battle raged for nine hours. The Portuguese claimed 200 Kwamato casualties against seven wounded and two dead Kwanyama on their side. But the Krupp had been disabled with a broken axis. On the 13th, 2500 Kwanyama left the column. Of the other African auxiliaries only the Himba showed any intention of staying until the end.
Without the possibility of being reinforced, all officers agreed that the column should retreat or face annihilation. First simulating an advance, the column retreated in good order and under fire for seven hours. The askaris had to charge twice before they could all reach the Cunene river by 3 p.m. of the 13th. Padrel had lost 11 dead and 31 wounded, many by cold-steel. The column had been saved by Padrel's and his staff's sang-froid. At Dombeafungue the Portuguese had to face an Ovambo coalition that in spite having heavy losses (around 800 casualties), did no sue for peace and was prepared to resist.
With most of Luhuna's chiefs captured the war was over. It had lasted five months. Of the 6632 captured cattle heads half was divided among the volunteers and half went to the Crown. Padrel left Humbe on the 1st of August 1891.
But the south still belonged to the ones who could raid it or had enough firepower to cross the vast wild hinterland, such as the Hottentot and the Boers or the British and Scandinavian hunters who sold huge quantities of arms and ammunition to the Kwanyama. For a month, from the 4th of January until the 5th of February 1893, a group of Boers and 9 Portuguese cavalrymen had to chase another Hottentot raid, killing thirty and retrieving 500 cattle and 6 horses.
The Third Humbe Revolt, 1897-1898
In 1897 the Humbe rebelled for the third time in twelve years. It was the most complex revolt of all. Its origins lay in a serious epidemic outbreak of bovine plague. The disease started in East Africa (1892-1893), and crossed the continent. It must have been one reason of the Matabele and Mashona revolts of 1896. The German authorities of Southwest Africa vaccinated all settlers cattle but cruelly left the Herero cattle to die. The Portuguese warned of what was happening south of the Cunene, forbade all cattle trade and ordered a massive vaccination. In order to protect the vaccination brigade sent to Humbe from probable Hottentot raids, colonel Artur de Paiva, a veteran of many campaigns in Central Angola, requested the presence of the Mossamedes Dragoons Company (European) that had replaced the Irregular Squadron. On the 22nd of October 1897, 151 men commanded by four officers arrived in Humbe. Most of them arrived on foot due to the horse sickness which had killed almost all their mounts. They were greeted by an apocalyptic sight. Everywhere was the stench of death, rotting carcasses and pestilent pyres. It became almost impossible to supply the troopers, so on November 26th the squadron was ordered to retreat from Humbe. Lacking supplies and with a great number of sick, the squadron started to move by platoons. On December 6, the 4th platoon under sergeant-major Silveira was the first to leave, followed next day by the 2nd and 3rd platoons under captain Baltazar de Brito and, on the 11th, the 1st platoon, made up of sick and convalescents with only two mules and a horse, under the command of lieutenant João Carlos de Saldanha, Earl of Almoster. The Humbe were by now refusing to vaccinate their cattle, spurred by the witchdoctors, they accused the Portuguese of administering bad medicine and using the sickness as an excuse for sending troops to fight them. In a short time the herds had melted like ice under the sun.
When the 1st platoon camped at Tchituba by dawn of the 12th of December 1897, the locals were already upset by the depredations made by the preceding units. Two soldiers and a bearer sent to a nearby village mistreated and killed a Humbe woman who refused to sell them supplies, and were closely chased to the Portuguese camp by a great number of screaming warriors (possibly a thousand), that had gathered for a funeral. Surprised by this sudden appearance, the dragoons put up a disorganised defence wile the bearers ran for their lives. Outnumbered and under fire from an enemy hidden in the bush, the Earl of Almoster ordered to resume the advance. At 2 p.m., after marching for six miles under fire, and with a growing number of wounded, the dragoons formed a small square and fired their last ammunitions. The Humbes continued to fire and, when there were only four dragoons and the wounded Earl of Almoster standing, finally closed in for the kill. All had ended, 14 troopers were dead and mutilated, seven were missing and eight escaped wounded. The heart of sergeant-major Pio was taken to be given to the Humbe children so that they could become as brave as the dragoons. The commander of the dragoons, with several days advance and blindly following orders, didn't even turn back to bury the bodies. This task fell upon a local farmer, José Lopes, and his servants, who found the remnants of the doomed column the next day.
The Humbe had revolted and on December 15th the fort was once again under siege. But this time many of the Humbi leaders weren't very keen in having the army on their lands, when they were loosing cattle by the thousands. The fort, defended by second-lieutenant José Felix with less than 40 native soldiers, was attacked during the night on the 18th, 19th, 20th and 24th of January 1898, which resulted in 1 dead and 5 wounded.
On the 25th of January 1898, colonel Artur de Paiva finally set out from the plateau with the relief force. The column had 16 officers, 30 artillerymen from Luanda, 120 dragoons, 280 askaris, 40 Boers, 100 volunteer settlers, 650 Bushmen and Himba (under the mercenary chief Oorlog), totalling 1252 men, with 5 artillery pieces, 50 wagons and 873 bearers. This time Artur de Paiva could count with around 300 white fightingmen to "punish the rebellious gentile".
The rainy season was at its peak and the trail was impassable. Under this murderous weather the men became ill, the wagons bogged down and the fording of rivers a nightmare. When they entered the Humbe district on February the 14th, the column stretched for 1,5 miles. On the morning of 16th, the square, cloaked by the smoke of burning libatas, reached Munyande were a loyal soba and his people joined the rest. In the distance, the savage beating of drums and war cries, sounded tragically desperate. At 11 a.m. a group of African auxiliaries was greeted with rifle fire, which increased rapidly. The cavalry was divided into three groups and the auxiliaries on foot chased the assailants for 6 miles. The Humbe lost 116 dead and a great number of wounded. Wile many others drowned when they tried to cross the swollen Caculovar river. On the 18th the Humbe attempted to ambush the column, but were thwarted by the quick response of the avant-garde, loosing a considerable number of men in the process. From then on, the Humbe were unable to stop this road-roller, that advanced under a punishing rain, at a speed of 3 miles a day. On the 23rd February 1898, the column finally entered the fort, after a month long hard march. The Humbe resistance had almost disappeared. After several months of small actions, which resulted in the capture of many prisoners and, 1500 ox and 2000 sheep taken, the operations ceased on the 20th of June 1898. The troops were in a miserable state. After a seven month long campaign, the column lost 8 killed, 23 wounded and 4 missing in action, and of the 96 who died of disease, 74 were white. The Humbe lost around 800 people and several hundred prisoners with almost all villages burned down. They would never become a serious threat again. Colonel Artur de Paiva would die in 1900, at sea, victim of the fever contracted during this campaign.
The Ovambo Resistance
Beyond the Cunene
When the 1st platoon camped at Tchituba by dawn of the 12th of December 1897, the locals were already upset by the depredations made by the preceding units. Two soldiers and a bearer sent to a nearby village mistreated and killed a Humbe woman who refused to sell them supplies, and were closely chased to the Portuguese camp by a great number of screaming warriors (possibly a thousand), that had gathered for a funeral. Surprised by this sudden appearance, the dragoons put up a disorganised defence wile the bearers ran for their lives. Outnumbered and under fire from an enemy hidden in the bush, the Earl of Almoster ordered to resume the advance. At 2 p.m., after marching for six miles under fire, and with a growing number of wounded, the dragoons formed a small square and fired their last ammunitions. The Humbes continued to fire and, when there were only four dragoons and the wounded Earl of Almoster standing, finally closed in for the kill. All had ended, 14 troopers were dead and mutilated, seven were missing and eight escaped wounded. The heart of sergeant-major Pio was taken to be given to the Humbe children so that they could become as brave as the dragoons. The commander of the dragoons, with several days advance and blindly following orders, didn't even turn back to bury the bodies. This task fell upon a local farmer, José Lopes, and his servants, who found the remnants of the doomed column the next day.
The Humbe had revolted and on December 15th the fort was once again under siege. But this time many of the Humbi leaders weren't very keen in having the army on their lands, when they were loosing cattle by the thousands. The fort, defended by second-lieutenant José Felix with less than 40 native soldiers, was attacked during the night on the 18th, 19th, 20th and 24th of January 1898, which resulted in 1 dead and 5 wounded.
On the 25th of January 1898, colonel Artur de Paiva finally set out from the plateau with the relief force. The column had 16 officers, 30 artillerymen from Luanda, 120 dragoons, 280 askaris, 40 Boers, 100 volunteer settlers, 650 Bushmen and Himba (under the mercenary chief Oorlog), totalling 1252 men, with 5 artillery pieces, 50 wagons and 873 bearers. This time Artur de Paiva could count with around 300 white fightingmen to "punish the rebellious gentile".
The rainy season was at its peak and the trail was impassable. Under this murderous weather the men became ill, the wagons bogged down and the fording of rivers a nightmare. When they entered the Humbe district on February the 14th, the column stretched for 1,5 miles. On the morning of 16th, the square, cloaked by the smoke of burning libatas, reached Munyande were a loyal soba and his people joined the rest. In the distance, the savage beating of drums and war cries, sounded tragically desperate. At 11 a.m. a group of African auxiliaries was greeted with rifle fire, which increased rapidly. The cavalry was divided into three groups and the auxiliaries on foot chased the assailants for 6 miles. The Humbe lost 116 dead and a great number of wounded. Wile many others drowned when they tried to cross the swollen Caculovar river. On the 18th the Humbe attempted to ambush the column, but were thwarted by the quick response of the avant-garde, loosing a considerable number of men in the process. From then on, the Humbe were unable to stop this road-roller, that advanced under a punishing rain, at a speed of 3 miles a day. On the 23rd February 1898, the column finally entered the fort, after a month long hard march. The Humbe resistance had almost disappeared. After several months of small actions, which resulted in the capture of many prisoners and, 1500 ox and 2000 sheep taken, the operations ceased on the 20th of June 1898. The troops were in a miserable state. After a seven month long campaign, the column lost 8 killed, 23 wounded and 4 missing in action, and of the 96 who died of disease, 74 were white. The Humbe lost around 800 people and several hundred prisoners with almost all villages burned down. They would never become a serious threat again. Colonel Artur de Paiva would die in 1900, at sea, victim of the fever contracted during this campaign.
The Ovambo Resistance
Beyond the Cunene
The southern frontier was as liquid as water. On February 1902, the Kwamatos started to raid the Humbes. Therefor the fort reinforced its garrison to company size. On the 17th of February 1902 this troops with auxiliaries and aided by the Humbes, inflicted heavy losses on the invaders (up to one hundred dead). At the end of 1903, the Huila district had two askari companies, one mixed company, one dragoon troop and one artillery section, in all 38 horses and mules and 263 rifles. They could also request the services of 200 Boers and settlers willing to fight. This meagre forces faced a population of 250 000 natives!
With the Germans pressing in the south, the Portuguese decided to prevent a possible invasion of northern Kwanyama by their neighbours. For the first time in Southern Angola, the Portuguese, raising a modern army from metropolitan cadre - 40 officers, 467 European soldiers (91 artillerymen, 105 cavalrymen, disciplinary soldiers, sappers, medical and transportation personnel and 10 naval machinegunners), and 613 askaris, totalling 1160 soldiers, aided by 11 European auxiliaries, 420 Oorlogs's African mercenaries and 500 Humbes - would go on the offensive. The governor of Huila and expedition leader, a simple engineers captain with the prerogatives of a general was ill suited for command. His officers were all but incompetent fools (with some exceptions), looking for promotion and medals in the war against "the blacks".
The Ovambo expected and were prepared for war. Father Lecomte, a French missionary advised the Portuguese to attack the Kwanyama from the north through Evale, avoiding the Kwamatos. In his opinion the Kwamato and Vale were dreaded foes. They were brave and intelligent warriors, not like the Kwanyama that preyed on the weak with their surprise attacks.
Because the governor's report was never published, one can only speculate why he decided to attack through Kwamato territory.
The Massacre, 25th of September 1904
With the Germans pressing in the south, the Portuguese decided to prevent a possible invasion of northern Kwanyama by their neighbours. For the first time in Southern Angola, the Portuguese, raising a modern army from metropolitan cadre - 40 officers, 467 European soldiers (91 artillerymen, 105 cavalrymen, disciplinary soldiers, sappers, medical and transportation personnel and 10 naval machinegunners), and 613 askaris, totalling 1160 soldiers, aided by 11 European auxiliaries, 420 Oorlogs's African mercenaries and 500 Humbes - would go on the offensive. The governor of Huila and expedition leader, a simple engineers captain with the prerogatives of a general was ill suited for command. His officers were all but incompetent fools (with some exceptions), looking for promotion and medals in the war against "the blacks".
The Ovambo expected and were prepared for war. Father Lecomte, a French missionary advised the Portuguese to attack the Kwanyama from the north through Evale, avoiding the Kwamatos. In his opinion the Kwamato and Vale were dreaded foes. They were brave and intelligent warriors, not like the Kwanyama that preyed on the weak with their surprise attacks.
Because the governor's report was never published, one can only speculate why he decided to attack through Kwamato territory.
The Massacre, 25th of September 1904
The Portuguese forded the Cunene river at Pembe (the same of 1891), on September 19th. The Kwamatos were waiting. From the 20th to the 24th there were some minor firefights. Then the Kwamatos tried to paralyse the column, that was still on the Cunene riverbank, by killing the ox and horses. To free the stranded square, governor Aguiar sent captain Pinto de Almeida, on the 25th of September, with a strong detachment of troops who's numbers were enough to conquer the Ovambo kingdoms: Two artillery pieces (old mountain-guns), two dragoon platoons and six infantry platoons, totalling 255 Europeans and 244 African soldiers, aided by many armed auxiliaries. A guide led the troops to a clearing were the Kwanyama hidden among the trees started to fire at the officers and then closed in. The cavalry charged, but the terrain was ill suited for them and many mounts were thus lost. Then the artillery stopped firing. At Umpungo the Portuguese had fallen into the favourite Kwanyama trap, who fired devastating volleys from their modern rifles - bought from the white hunters and traders - at a distance of 100 meters. Against such a concentration of firepower, unusual in the dark continent and specially in Angola, the Portuguese discipline crumbled as ammunition ran low. The bugle sounded the retreat but, it was too late. The auxiliaries had routed before the Kwamatos charged for hand-to-hand combat, brandishing their maces and assegai. Aguiar who stayed in camp 2 miles behind did not move in support of the surrounded square. His ineptitude was such that, when he finally decided to send infantry with ammunition, the supporting artillery fired upon the retreating survivors that emerged out of the bush. Killing three officers and 22 soldiers. In the clearing, the remaining soldiers were all slaughtered.
The casualties list is staggering. In less than two hours, the Portuguese had lost 250 dead and missing. Aguiar decided to ford the Cunene that same day, leaving behind the unburied bodies, two guns, two ammunition wagons and hundreds of rifles. It was a sad affair. Blamed for the disaster, governor Aguiar was dismissed. The military garrisons on the plateau were reinforced fearing an Ovambo offensive. Nothing happened. Luckily, the Kwamatos were unable to establish an Ovambo coalition, losing a superb opportunity to exploit their victory.
Preparing the Revenge
The casualties list is staggering. In less than two hours, the Portuguese had lost 250 dead and missing. Aguiar decided to ford the Cunene that same day, leaving behind the unburied bodies, two guns, two ammunition wagons and hundreds of rifles. It was a sad affair. Blamed for the disaster, governor Aguiar was dismissed. The military garrisons on the plateau were reinforced fearing an Ovambo offensive. Nothing happened. Luckily, the Kwamatos were unable to establish an Ovambo coalition, losing a superb opportunity to exploit their victory.
Preparing the Revenge
The Portuguese government soon made plans to beat the Ovambo. From a report made in July 1905 by a Portuguese officer who travelled beyond the Cunene to gather information, the Ovambo could call up to 18 000 men armed with 8000 rifles. The new governor of Huila, captain Alves Roçadas decided to prepare the terrain for future expeditions. In June, Hangalo, the despotic ruler of Mulondo, refused to let the Portuguese build a fort on his territory. He had been spared by previous expeditions to Humbe. On the 25th of October, his fortified embala was bombarded and taken. His 1000 men army was defeated and his head was cut-off as a warning to others. From 1905 until 1906, Roçadas, in a series of operations, cleared the plateau and Humbe of all potential threats to his rear and established a fort in Kwamatwi territory (Fort Roçadas), on the other side of the Cunene river, in front of Humbe. One of the prises of this campaign was the capture of the long time fugitive Luhuna.
The Kwamato Campaign, 1907
The Kwamato Campaign, 1907
In 1907, modern warfare reached Angola with its thousands of European infantrymen, trenches, water-carts, a Decauville railroad, a gunboat and... a war correspondent. The great metropolitan expedition arrived at the end of June 1907: 87 officers, 1306 European troops, 906 African troops, 115 auxiliaries, 57 civilians, and 24 deportees. The number of auxiliaries was very small compared to the previous campaigns: 14 Portuguese and 18 Boer horsemen with 83 African auxiliaries. It would take two months to concentrate the troops at Fort Roçadas.
Captain Roçadas organised everything, leaving nothing to chance. He gathered 10 artillery pieces, four machineguns and 1602 rifles, plus 44 wagons and empty bags to be filled with sand as needed.
HQ:
Commander, Captain Alves Roçadas
Chief-of-staff, Captain Eduardo Marques
Staff, 7 officers and 12 men.
Sappers: 1 officer, 2 sergeants, 20 sappers and 40 native auxiliaries.
Artillery:
1 batt. 4 Ehrhardt pieces, 3 officers, 52 men and 19 mules.1 batt. 4 Canet (old model) pieces, 3 officers, 50 men, 20 mules.
1 batt. 4 Ehrhardt pieces, 3 officers, 52 men and 19 mules.1 batt. 4 Canet (old model) pieces, 3 officers, 50 men, 20 mules.
1 section 2 Krupp Mountain Guns, 1 officer, 18 men, 8 oxen.1 batt. 4 Nordenfeld machineguns, 2 officers, 18 men, 8 oxen.
Cavalry: Commander, Capt. Montez
1st Dragoon sqd. (carbines), 4 officers, 1 veterinary, 93 men and 17 African auxiliaries.
Mounts: 100 mules.
2nd Dragoon sqd. (lancers), 4 officers, 1 veterinary, 110 men and 30 African auxiliaries.
Mounts: 95 horses and 21 mules.Infantry:
2nd Naval Company, 4 officers and 168 men.12th Infantry Company, 5 officers and 220 men.
2nd Naval Company, 4 officers and 168 men.12th Infantry Company, 5 officers and 220 men.
Disciplinary Company of Angola, 5 officers and 147 men.
1st European Company of Angola, 5 officers and 175 men.
2nd European Company of Angola, 5 officers and 124 men.
10th Mozambique Company (Askaris), 5 officers and 200 men.
14th Native Company of Angola, 6 officers and 176 men.
15th Native Company of Angola, 6 officers and 158 men.
16th Native Company of Angola, 6 officers and 177 men.
Auxiliaries: Commander, Lieutenant Teixeira Pinto
14 Portuguese, 18 Boers and 83 Oorlog's mercenaries.
Train & Ambulance: 67 wagons and 40 men.
For this campaign the Portuguese had a trump card named Calipalula (or Caripalula). He was of royal blood and had been badly treated and expelled from Big Kwamato, barely escaping alive. Treated by the Portuguese in Humbe, he was persuaded to guide the expedition into Kwamato territory, and reveal the location of the badly needed water wells (cacimbas).
On the Kwamato side the much feared "Ovambo League" had partially been established. The Kwanyama sent 12 lengas (4000 men), under the command of Makir, one of their best chiefs. The Kwambi, Ongandjera and Ombalanto also sent warriors. But the Vale, the Kwaluthi, and the numerous Ondonga were not present. The Hinga (Humbes from beyond-Cunene), came to support their neighbours, but the Humbes from the Portuguese side of the border limited themselves to providing information about the troops. Their numbers were between 15 to 20 thousand warriors, 7000 of them armed with Snyder, Martini-Henry, Kropathschek, and Mauser rifles. The Portuguese arrogantly hoped to triumph with just 2300 men where, the Germans with five times as much troops wouldn't dare to go.
After repairing the bridge over the Cunene river, damaged by floods; opening a trail two miles long through the bush and a small firefight by the reconnaissance detail; The troops began their offensive march, in double column, at 5 a.m. on the 26th of August 1907. The column adopted the classic disposition of colonial campaigns, with the train and baggage in the middle, and the regular troops positioned so that they could easily form a defensive square. The objective was to take the royal embala of Maghogo of chief Sihetekela, soba of Little Kwamato, followed by an invasion of soba Oikhula's Big Kwamato and the occupation of the entire region with army posts. The Kwamato was divided in two separate kingdoms, each with its own soba. The more numerous, but less warlike and worst equipped, was Big Kwamato. The less numerous but much more heavily armed and aggressive, was Little Kwamato. It was the latter that took the brunt of the offensive. The Ovambo Armageddon had begun. The march followed without incidents during the first day, and at night the bivouacked square eared the loud address of the Kwamatos challenges and menaces, all around. By dawn, the column, guided by Caripalula, started to advance towards the Aucongo water wells. After a wile, at around 9 a.m., bands of warriors were sighted in the distance by the scouts, moving to envelop the square. When the troops reached a large clearing named Mufilo they stopped. The Kwamatos suddenly broke fire, attacking the train that was still moving into the inside of the square. During a full hour, the cavalry and native infantry escort defended the advance until it reached the centre in good order. By now a savage fire had enveloped the Portuguese positions with a choking grip. The platoons and artillery responded with regular and steady volleys.
The invisible foe, who had a respectful arsenal and no lack of ammunition, continued its deadly fire at a distance of 150-300 meters. The air was criss-crossed by numerous hissing rounds, and the list of wounded started to grow. The commander's aide-de-champ was struck on the neck; the commander of the 14th Native Infantry company, with one arm pierced, continued to give orders; Some have their slouch hats holed, and the chief-of-staff's horse was killed by a bullet. Trying to loosen the grip, commander Roçadas, orders the right face under captain Patacho, followed by the rear under captain Ribeiro, a bayonet charge into the bush wood. At the same time, the cavalry walked at the trot and then charged carrying every thing in front for a mile, wile on the left the Naval and Disciplinary companies, advancing by platoons, cleared the bush. But the enemy did not retreat, and returned to their previous positions after the infantry and cavalry charges. In the meantime, the first line of troops was ordered to fill the sand bags, wile the artillery and second line maintained fire. After four intensive hours, the fire started to die down. Small pockets of resistance were still active, so the 2nd cavalry squadron charged once again. Suddenly, finding themselves surrounded, they opened their way through the enemy with a brilliant charge at lance point. After a 2 hours struggle, under the day's declining beam, the squadron returned to the square in good order, with bugles playing the War March and carrying their wounded. A jubilous cry exploded from the square, as every soldier jumped and waved their hats, forgetting the still observing Kwamatos. As night fell, only the sound of isolated shots and the wounded groans, could be eared. The Portuguese lost 12 European, 2 African soldiers and an officer dead, and 55 wounded. The 1904 disaster had been avenged. The Portuguese had regained their self confidence and buried the myth of Kwamato invincibility. Badly mauled during the battle, the Kwanyama contingent left for home.
The following day, the column reached Aucongo, were a fortified position was established. Unfortunately the wells were almost empty, and the water reserves had to be used. On the 29th a cavalry detachment sent to water the cattle at a nearby lagoon was attacked but escaped with minor casualties. On the 30th, with water running low, all the wagons, with a strong escort, were sent to the rear carrying the sick and wounded, and to bring supplies. Somehow it was never attacked, and on the 1st of September was back at Aucongo. On the 2nd of September, the camp suffered a furious attack by the assegai experts, the Kwambi. The air was filled with the roar of thousands of voices crying "Ta-tweh, ta-tweh, Kwambi!" (Charge, charge, Kwambi!). Seeing the enemy gathering in the bush around the camp, Roçadas decided to take the offensive. Leaving a company to defend the unfinished fortified post, he ordered a second heavily escorted train to head for Fort Roçadas with the sick and wounded, wile he and the rest of the square advanced upon Macuvi, diverting the enemies attention from the train with this double movement.
The artillery fired a few shots, wile the sappers, protected by a detachment of hand picked Naval Infantry sharpshooters, set fire to the nearby huts. After the train had left, the square began to retreat to the post by echelons. The Kwamatos tried to cut-off the retreat by occupying the bush behind the troops, positioning themselves between the square and the unfinished post. A furious combat ensued. The sailors and the infantrymen of the 12th European company, aided by machineguns, kept their cool, retreating slowly under fire. The artillery almost lost their mules but kept firing at the occasional targets. The combat lasted three hours at the cost of 6 dead and 30 wounded. At Aucongo, from the 29th of August until the 4th of September the Portuguese lost a total of 13 dead and 34 wounded. On the 7th the train was back.
With the Aucongo army post completed, a strong garrison is posted, wile on the 11th the rest of the column heads for Tchamuinde's water wells, were water was good and plentiful. The advance was accompanied by the Kwamatos sporadic shots, and the permanent war chants in the distance. On the 13th the march was resumed to occupy Damekero and then move to Aluendo and its water wells. The advance was made under violent fire from the Kwamatos who, hiding in the bush and behind termite mounds, had enveloped the square. Wile the sappers and auxiliaries opened a trail, the infantry fired regular volleys. On the right face of the square, the 1st European and the 10th Mozambique companies cleared the bush with the bayonet, as the East Africans chanted their war cry. When the huts of Damekero were sighted, the artillery poured a few rounds and in a short time the village was assaulted and cleared by the Naval and 12th European companies. The square halted and entrenched with sand bags, wile the cavalry cleared the terrain around the position. The Kwamatos finally retreated after four hours of fighting, showing a resilience and a will to triumph that would only be broken by the following operations. The Portuguese suffered 24 casualties, including 8 dead.
A fortified post was established, with a garrison, and another train left for supplies which returned with a 400 contingent of Humbi auxiliaries. Caripaluli and the Portuguese settler, José Lopes, tried to parliament with the Kwamatos, but were welcomed with rifle fire. On the dawn of the 20th the troops resumed the advance towards Aluendo. The column was lightly fired upon. When the square bivouacked at Mupala, another firefight broke out. For several hours, wile the troops entrenched, the Kwamatos, as usual hiding behind termite mounds and in the bush, maintained a constant fire, inflicting 22 casualties, including 4 dead on the Portuguese.
The next day the Inyoca water wells were taken with the bayonet by the 12th and Naval companies. Here the troops and cattle were able to kill the thirst and rest under the shade of large trees. 11 kilometres to the south, Maghogo was set on fire by the panicked population. On the 22nd, the Portuguese reached the fortified embala. Ignoring that Sihetekela had abandoned the place with a small number of warriors, the artillery bombarded the village, followed by a bayonet assault of the infantry, which took it without resistance. As the heavy rains of the season began to fall, the troops occupied the kraal and began to build the fort of Don Luis de Bragança. The flag was raised on the 28th of September 1907. In a month long operation the Portuguese had suffered 42 dead and 125 wounded. The Kwamato casualties were unknown, since non had surrendered or been taken prisoner.
After resting and re-supplying for several days, the square began to move on Big Kwamato, on the morning of the 4th of October 1907, with a force of 1284 men. As the troops advanced towards soba Oikhula's royal embala of Nalueke, they began to receive rifle fire from the defenders. At 10 a.m. when the square reached a dense bush wood near the embala, the fire suddenly stopped. The square halted as the artillery fired over the palisade, the train moved between the front and rear faces wile the sides moved forward occupying the flanks of the line. The troops started to advance with a steady pace, but soon after all the line charged enthusiastically the battlements. Not a living soul was found inside or around the place. Oikhula, drunk and refusing to leave, escaped . Big Kwamato had crumbled in just one day. The spoils of the 1904 massacre, including two cannons, were recovered and sent to the rear During the 11 kilometres long march and the 2 hours firefight, the column suffered another 3 dead and 11 wounded. The ten actions of this campaign had cost the Portuguese a total of 205 men: 5 officers, 53 European and 8 African dead; and 5 officers, 91 European and 43 African wounded. Of the metropolitan contingent, 346 men were sick.
Caripalula, was named soba in recognition for his services, but was not accepted by his people. He tried to commit suicide with a gunshot to the head but failed. A new soba, Cabungo Popiene, was then elected by the elders. On the 11th, the fever stricken column left for the rear. On the 19th of October 1907, the troops finally reached the home base. The war had ended after two month of fighting.
During 1908, the remaining Kwamatos under Sihetekela resorted to guerrilla warfare. From then on, the Portuguese advanced to the South West African border and resumed the occupation of the East. The last Ovambo kingdom, the Kwanyama, would resist until 1916.
For this campaign the Portuguese had a trump card named Calipalula (or Caripalula). He was of royal blood and had been badly treated and expelled from Big Kwamato, barely escaping alive. Treated by the Portuguese in Humbe, he was persuaded to guide the expedition into Kwamato territory, and reveal the location of the badly needed water wells (cacimbas).
On the Kwamato side the much feared "Ovambo League" had partially been established. The Kwanyama sent 12 lengas (4000 men), under the command of Makir, one of their best chiefs. The Kwambi, Ongandjera and Ombalanto also sent warriors. But the Vale, the Kwaluthi, and the numerous Ondonga were not present. The Hinga (Humbes from beyond-Cunene), came to support their neighbours, but the Humbes from the Portuguese side of the border limited themselves to providing information about the troops. Their numbers were between 15 to 20 thousand warriors, 7000 of them armed with Snyder, Martini-Henry, Kropathschek, and Mauser rifles. The Portuguese arrogantly hoped to triumph with just 2300 men where, the Germans with five times as much troops wouldn't dare to go.
After repairing the bridge over the Cunene river, damaged by floods; opening a trail two miles long through the bush and a small firefight by the reconnaissance detail; The troops began their offensive march, in double column, at 5 a.m. on the 26th of August 1907. The column adopted the classic disposition of colonial campaigns, with the train and baggage in the middle, and the regular troops positioned so that they could easily form a defensive square. The objective was to take the royal embala of Maghogo of chief Sihetekela, soba of Little Kwamato, followed by an invasion of soba Oikhula's Big Kwamato and the occupation of the entire region with army posts. The Kwamato was divided in two separate kingdoms, each with its own soba. The more numerous, but less warlike and worst equipped, was Big Kwamato. The less numerous but much more heavily armed and aggressive, was Little Kwamato. It was the latter that took the brunt of the offensive. The Ovambo Armageddon had begun. The march followed without incidents during the first day, and at night the bivouacked square eared the loud address of the Kwamatos challenges and menaces, all around. By dawn, the column, guided by Caripalula, started to advance towards the Aucongo water wells. After a wile, at around 9 a.m., bands of warriors were sighted in the distance by the scouts, moving to envelop the square. When the troops reached a large clearing named Mufilo they stopped. The Kwamatos suddenly broke fire, attacking the train that was still moving into the inside of the square. During a full hour, the cavalry and native infantry escort defended the advance until it reached the centre in good order. By now a savage fire had enveloped the Portuguese positions with a choking grip. The platoons and artillery responded with regular and steady volleys.
The invisible foe, who had a respectful arsenal and no lack of ammunition, continued its deadly fire at a distance of 150-300 meters. The air was criss-crossed by numerous hissing rounds, and the list of wounded started to grow. The commander's aide-de-champ was struck on the neck; the commander of the 14th Native Infantry company, with one arm pierced, continued to give orders; Some have their slouch hats holed, and the chief-of-staff's horse was killed by a bullet. Trying to loosen the grip, commander Roçadas, orders the right face under captain Patacho, followed by the rear under captain Ribeiro, a bayonet charge into the bush wood. At the same time, the cavalry walked at the trot and then charged carrying every thing in front for a mile, wile on the left the Naval and Disciplinary companies, advancing by platoons, cleared the bush. But the enemy did not retreat, and returned to their previous positions after the infantry and cavalry charges. In the meantime, the first line of troops was ordered to fill the sand bags, wile the artillery and second line maintained fire. After four intensive hours, the fire started to die down. Small pockets of resistance were still active, so the 2nd cavalry squadron charged once again. Suddenly, finding themselves surrounded, they opened their way through the enemy with a brilliant charge at lance point. After a 2 hours struggle, under the day's declining beam, the squadron returned to the square in good order, with bugles playing the War March and carrying their wounded. A jubilous cry exploded from the square, as every soldier jumped and waved their hats, forgetting the still observing Kwamatos. As night fell, only the sound of isolated shots and the wounded groans, could be eared. The Portuguese lost 12 European, 2 African soldiers and an officer dead, and 55 wounded. The 1904 disaster had been avenged. The Portuguese had regained their self confidence and buried the myth of Kwamato invincibility. Badly mauled during the battle, the Kwanyama contingent left for home.
The following day, the column reached Aucongo, were a fortified position was established. Unfortunately the wells were almost empty, and the water reserves had to be used. On the 29th a cavalry detachment sent to water the cattle at a nearby lagoon was attacked but escaped with minor casualties. On the 30th, with water running low, all the wagons, with a strong escort, were sent to the rear carrying the sick and wounded, and to bring supplies. Somehow it was never attacked, and on the 1st of September was back at Aucongo. On the 2nd of September, the camp suffered a furious attack by the assegai experts, the Kwambi. The air was filled with the roar of thousands of voices crying "Ta-tweh, ta-tweh, Kwambi!" (Charge, charge, Kwambi!). Seeing the enemy gathering in the bush around the camp, Roçadas decided to take the offensive. Leaving a company to defend the unfinished fortified post, he ordered a second heavily escorted train to head for Fort Roçadas with the sick and wounded, wile he and the rest of the square advanced upon Macuvi, diverting the enemies attention from the train with this double movement.
The artillery fired a few shots, wile the sappers, protected by a detachment of hand picked Naval Infantry sharpshooters, set fire to the nearby huts. After the train had left, the square began to retreat to the post by echelons. The Kwamatos tried to cut-off the retreat by occupying the bush behind the troops, positioning themselves between the square and the unfinished post. A furious combat ensued. The sailors and the infantrymen of the 12th European company, aided by machineguns, kept their cool, retreating slowly under fire. The artillery almost lost their mules but kept firing at the occasional targets. The combat lasted three hours at the cost of 6 dead and 30 wounded. At Aucongo, from the 29th of August until the 4th of September the Portuguese lost a total of 13 dead and 34 wounded. On the 7th the train was back.
With the Aucongo army post completed, a strong garrison is posted, wile on the 11th the rest of the column heads for Tchamuinde's water wells, were water was good and plentiful. The advance was accompanied by the Kwamatos sporadic shots, and the permanent war chants in the distance. On the 13th the march was resumed to occupy Damekero and then move to Aluendo and its water wells. The advance was made under violent fire from the Kwamatos who, hiding in the bush and behind termite mounds, had enveloped the square. Wile the sappers and auxiliaries opened a trail, the infantry fired regular volleys. On the right face of the square, the 1st European and the 10th Mozambique companies cleared the bush with the bayonet, as the East Africans chanted their war cry. When the huts of Damekero were sighted, the artillery poured a few rounds and in a short time the village was assaulted and cleared by the Naval and 12th European companies. The square halted and entrenched with sand bags, wile the cavalry cleared the terrain around the position. The Kwamatos finally retreated after four hours of fighting, showing a resilience and a will to triumph that would only be broken by the following operations. The Portuguese suffered 24 casualties, including 8 dead.
A fortified post was established, with a garrison, and another train left for supplies which returned with a 400 contingent of Humbi auxiliaries. Caripaluli and the Portuguese settler, José Lopes, tried to parliament with the Kwamatos, but were welcomed with rifle fire. On the dawn of the 20th the troops resumed the advance towards Aluendo. The column was lightly fired upon. When the square bivouacked at Mupala, another firefight broke out. For several hours, wile the troops entrenched, the Kwamatos, as usual hiding behind termite mounds and in the bush, maintained a constant fire, inflicting 22 casualties, including 4 dead on the Portuguese.
The next day the Inyoca water wells were taken with the bayonet by the 12th and Naval companies. Here the troops and cattle were able to kill the thirst and rest under the shade of large trees. 11 kilometres to the south, Maghogo was set on fire by the panicked population. On the 22nd, the Portuguese reached the fortified embala. Ignoring that Sihetekela had abandoned the place with a small number of warriors, the artillery bombarded the village, followed by a bayonet assault of the infantry, which took it without resistance. As the heavy rains of the season began to fall, the troops occupied the kraal and began to build the fort of Don Luis de Bragança. The flag was raised on the 28th of September 1907. In a month long operation the Portuguese had suffered 42 dead and 125 wounded. The Kwamato casualties were unknown, since non had surrendered or been taken prisoner.
After resting and re-supplying for several days, the square began to move on Big Kwamato, on the morning of the 4th of October 1907, with a force of 1284 men. As the troops advanced towards soba Oikhula's royal embala of Nalueke, they began to receive rifle fire from the defenders. At 10 a.m. when the square reached a dense bush wood near the embala, the fire suddenly stopped. The square halted as the artillery fired over the palisade, the train moved between the front and rear faces wile the sides moved forward occupying the flanks of the line. The troops started to advance with a steady pace, but soon after all the line charged enthusiastically the battlements. Not a living soul was found inside or around the place. Oikhula, drunk and refusing to leave, escaped . Big Kwamato had crumbled in just one day. The spoils of the 1904 massacre, including two cannons, were recovered and sent to the rear During the 11 kilometres long march and the 2 hours firefight, the column suffered another 3 dead and 11 wounded. The ten actions of this campaign had cost the Portuguese a total of 205 men: 5 officers, 53 European and 8 African dead; and 5 officers, 91 European and 43 African wounded. Of the metropolitan contingent, 346 men were sick.
Caripalula, was named soba in recognition for his services, but was not accepted by his people. He tried to commit suicide with a gunshot to the head but failed. A new soba, Cabungo Popiene, was then elected by the elders. On the 11th, the fever stricken column left for the rear. On the 19th of October 1907, the troops finally reached the home base. The war had ended after two month of fighting.
During 1908, the remaining Kwamatos under Sihetekela resorted to guerrilla warfare. From then on, the Portuguese advanced to the South West African border and resumed the occupation of the East. The last Ovambo kingdom, the Kwanyama, would resist until 1916.
Bibliography
História das Campanhas de Angola, Pélissier, René, (Estampa 1986)
História das Campanhas de Angola, Pélissier, René, (Estampa 1986)
A Campanha do Cuamato, Velloso de Castro, (Loanda 1908)
Roçadas na ocupação do Sul de Angola, Almeida Teixeira, (Lisboa 1935)
Campanha do Humbe 1897-98, Luiz de Pina Guimarães, (Lisboa 1938)
Os auxiliares na ocupação do Sul de Angola, Gastão Sousa Dias, (Lisboa 1943)
[Copiado de The King's Carabine]
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